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I PMCs – Outsourcing in the U.S. Army 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Preface 
 
 
Security and defense have always been tasks that were exclusively performed by 
public authorities. However, the state monopoly on the instruments of force was 
weakened in the last decades as a result of the privatization trend which made 
several public activities, such as railways, electric power supply, waste disposal 
services and also defense functions available to private sector providers.  
 
This change was triggered by worldwide occurring austerity measures which had a 
severe impact on defense budgets that were already heavily charged with enormous 
costs for more and more important logistic functions and the development of high-
tech weapon systems within most armies. This gap of lacking financial resources 
and the coeval need in state-of-the-art equipment and service was soon filled by 
private providers being able to work more efficient as public institutions yet still cost-
effective.  
 
Nevertheless, the defense array cannot be treated like any other industry that is 
privatized as whenever the exercise of force and weapons is concerned outmost 
precaution has to exhibit. Bearing in mind latest problems of irregularities at defense 
contracts tendering procedures and criminal convictions of private military 
company’s employees in the Iraq War it is indispensable to keep a tab on and 
possibly restrain the suppliers of privatized defense tasks.  
 
The options for inclusion of private companies for defense functions are manifold 
and show many peculiarities. As the United States still represent the global power 
and the U.S. Army has commonly taken a stake in international armed conflicts for 
decades, this paper focuses on the instrument of outsourcing as the leading way of 
how the U.S. Army employs the private sector. 
 
 
1.2 Structure 
 
In the first chapters a definition for outsourcing as well as a brief history of the U.S. 
Army’s past experience with the private industry is given. In chapter four the many 
reasons for the recent tremendous use of non-public enterprises for public functions 
in general business are listed. Consequently, the grounds for outsourcing within the 
U.S. defense realm are presented. In the following chapter Private Military 
Companies (PMCs) which are the enterprises that are awarded outsourcing 
contracts by the U.S. Army, are portrayed in detail by means of several examples. 
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Furthermore, in this abstract a distinction between the different kinds of PMCs is 
made based on the fact that their areas of work often widely differ. Some companies 
merely offer consultancy whereas others deploy employees into scenes of war 
where they even are engaged in combat.  
 
Chapter six concentrates on the A-76 process, a specific tendering procedure that is 
used for awarding outsourcing contracts in the United States. The particular phases 
of A-76 as well as lessons learned from the past are presented additionally. 
 
Chapter seven draws attention to legal questions relating to private participation in 
the defense area. First, the history of law concerning private military actors is 
produced; secondly, the present situation is analyzed; and thirdly, attempts from the 
United States as well as from international institutions to build a worldwide valid 
legal framework for PMCs are pictured. In chapter eight, a brief summary of the 
advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing presented in this paper is given.  
 
 
The second part of this paper is a digression on the German experience on Public-
private-partnerships (PPP) which constitutes a second method of applying private 
resources in addition to the procedure of outsourcing. The term PPP is accurately 
defined and two examples of such forms of cooperation are portrayed. Furthermore 
the legal framework for the establishment of PPPs and problems associated with 
tendering procedures are presented on the basis of current court decisions. Finally a 
conclusion gives pros and cons of the use of PPPs as well as it picks out PMCs and 
PPPs respective virtues.  
 
 
Before reading this paper, it is particularly important to note that whenever the term 
U.S. Army is used it relates to the U.S. Armed Forces in general and does not refer 
to any specific unit of the U.S. troops. Although the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Air Force are independent units within the American defense system also well-nigh 
all literature on this topic applies the term U.S. Army without the intent to reference 
to any unit in specific but to the U.S. Defense forces as a whole. 
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2 Disambiguation – Public-private-partnerships (PPPs) 
 
Several definitions for PPPs exist, yet none of them is generally accepted. This 
situation is caused by the fact that every single approach values the term in a 
different way. Some theorists argue from an economical, some other from a juridical 
standpoint, all of them leading to varying definitions. Therefore it is important to 
commit to a definition which will be used throughout this paper.  
 
The two most distinguished definitions bring up the terms PPP in a wider sense, 
representing the generic name for all procedures of provision and procurement that 
contain at least both, a public and a private, concern and PPP in a narrower sense, 
describing a special cooperation between the public and the private sector under 
which an own entity owned by both parties is set up and put into charge of former 
public activities. Due to the fact that a compendium of both kinds of PPP would go 
beyond the scope of this paper, the reader shall keep in mind that whenever the 
term PPP is used in the upcoming pages it will refer to PPP in a narrower sense. 
Nevertheless, in the following both definitions are briefly described: 
 
2.1 PPP in a wider sense 
 
Weber argues that a PPP in a wider sense includes joint ventures, cooperations, 
contracts and any other business relationships that hold a connection between the 
public and the private sector1. Also according to Initiative D21, Germany’s largest 
PPP which was found in 1999 by German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, 
representing a network of political, academic and private leaders2, the PPP in a 
wider sense comprises all projects with at least a marginal joint work between the 
public and the private sector aiming to a more profitable performance of public 
activities than before3. The following figure displays several kinds of PPPs within the 
term’s wider interpretation: 
 
 
                                                
1 Comp. Weber (2004), p.7ff., in: Mittendorfer/Weber (2004) 
2 Comp. Bundesregierung, http://www.bundesregierung.de (2005) 
3 Comp. Prozessleitfaden Public Private Partnership (2003), p.9 
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Figure 1: Public Private Partnerships in a wider sense4
 
Furthermore, PPPs in a wider sense can be divided in formal privatization, relating 
to a situation in which the public sector uses forms of organizations under private 
law for the provision of its tasks, and substantial privatization, referring to a situation 
in which the public sector takes in a private partner for the performance of public 
tasks. Substantial privatization can in turn be carried in different ways, such as using 
an operating control model, a cooperation model, an operating model or a 
concession model5.  
 
Concerning the German Army, several methods of PPPs in a wider sense are used. 
Examples include outsourcing, PPPs in a narrower sense, such as the LH 
Bundeswehr, or the establishment of in-house corporations6.  
 
2.2 PPP in a narrower sense 
 
On the contrary, PPP in a narrower sense describes the situation in which the public 
and the private sector together establish their own entity that is responsible for the 
provision or procurement of former public services and goods. From this point of 
view, PPP can easily be differentiated from outsourcing and thus using exemplarily 
PMCs and conventional procurement as the following figure shows: 
 
                                                
4 modelled after Prozessleitfaden Public Private Partnership (2003), p.11 
5 Comp. Oberhuber (2004), p.143ff., in: Mittendorfer/Weber (2004) and Pircher 
(2003), p.15ff., in: Gröhs (2003) 
6 Comp. Gramm (2004), p.81 
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Figure 2: Conventional procurement, outsourcing and PPP7
 
In the case of conventional procurement the public sector is supplying goods without 
private input. Examples include the issuance of passports or the provision of social 
security benefits. Outsourcing describes the situation in which a private company is 
contracted by a public organization to take over former public tasks against 
payment. A paradigm is the shift of waste disposal functions, which are more and 
more performed by private contractors. Finally, a PPP represents a procedure in 
which public tasks are carried out by an institution, a so called PPP that is 
established by the public and the private sector together. This instrument does not 
merely present a method of procurement or provision of public tasks but also a way 
of financing as investments are shared between the public and the private sector. 
PPP in a narrower sense also describes a long-term partnership lasting for the 
whole life cycle of a project and not merely a part, e.g. the procurement of 
components, of it8. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Figure created by the author 
8 Comp. Bundesverwaltungsamt (2004) 
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2.3 Outsourcing 
 
“Outsourcing is the transfer of a function previously performed in 
house to an outside provider. It involves the movement of work, 
but often not the transfer of responsibility and accountability or 
oversight, to the external provider. Using a third-party logistics 
company to provide logistics support is considered 
outsourcing9.” 
 
Even more simply expressed, you can say outsourcing is the act of obtaining 
services from an external institution. Nevertheless merely buying products or 
services from another company must not be necessarily considered as an 
outsourcing-process, especially as it is defined as a simple vendor relationship. 
Hüttner and Heuer offer a more plain definition by bringing up the term make-or-buy-
decision which describes the choice between internal and external procurement10.  
Hopfenbeck enhances their definition by stating that outsourcing always aims at a 
long-term strategic orientation on procurement from a third party. Furthermore he 
distinguishes between companies that merely contract one external provider (single 
sourcing), two providers (dual sourcing) or more of them (multiple sourcing)11. Bruch 
further elucidates that outsourcing also aims at a clear-cut divide of tasks between 
the contractor and the contracted company12.  
Another distinction can be found in the geographical location of the third-party 
provider. If the contracting organization outsources to a company that is not located 
in the same country this process is called offshore outsourcing13. Nowadays off-
shoring is mostly performed with low-pay countries such as India, Pakistan or China.  
Outsourcing always involves the partial transfer of management control to the 
supplier and a two-way exchange of information, co-ordination, and trust. When 
outsourcing is performed, particularly non-core competencies and daily routine tasks 
are transmitted to a third-party supplier. Key components of entrepreneurial 
activities constitute the basis for a company’s success and therefore they are not 
subject to outsourcing. In most cases an outsourcing process leads to a 
strengthening of core competencies as more financial as well as human resources 
can be invested in an enterprise’s main tasks that were previously tied to non-core 
assignments14. Thus it implies that any organization, be it a private firm, an NGO or 
a government agency, has to assess which of its activities has strategic importance 
for its competitive position and hence for the company’s success, before it comes to 
                                                
9 Withers (2000), p.38  
10 Comp. Hüttner and Heuer (2004), p.118 
11 Comp. Hopfenbeck (2002), p.719 
12 Comp. Bruch (1998), p.16 
13 Comp. Kobayashi-Hillary (2004) 
14 Comp. Töpfer (2005), p.502 
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the decision of whether to outsource or not. Additionally it is utmost important to 
mention that core-competencies must never be outsourced as this would bear the 
risk of uncertain dependence from the future provider and would furthermore lead to 
the loss of a firm’s unique know-how15.   
The following chart illustrates the characteristics and differences between core-
competencies and non-core competencies and their possibility of getting 
outsourced: 
  Attributes of functions Procurement 
low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Definable 
• Self-contained 
• Specific 
• Strategically inconsiderable 
• Segregated 
• Standardized  
• clear-cut 
• assignable 
 
 
 
External 
 =  
Buy 
=  
Outsourcing 
 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
‘ p
ro
xi
m
ity
 to
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or
e-
bu
si
ne
ss
 
high 
 
 
 
 
• Indefinite 
• Complex 
• Sporadic 
• Irregular 
• Strategically significant 
• Business specific 
• Indefinable 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
= 
Make 
 
Table 1: Core and non-core tasks’ attributes relevant for outsourcing decisions16
 
                                                
15 Comp. Töpfer (2005), p.750, p.1274 
16 Based on Bruch (1998), p.63 
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Typical examples of outsourced functions of companies considered being non-core 
operations though being very important to most companies are cleaning works, call 
centers, IT-operations17, facility management, house-keeping or managing the 
restaurant staff18. Southwest Airlines, one of the largest airlines in the United States, 
represents a perfect example of outsourcing maintenance tasks. It contracted out all 
aircraft maintenance to a third-party provider that specializes in this service. Thereby 
Southwest is able to save expenses such as facilities, personnel, and inventory 
which are all necessary for these tasks and can thereby concentrate on its core-
competency that is simply providing convenient flights19. 
The term outsourcing derives from the three words outside, resource and using. A 
different semantic interpretation esteems out and source as the two components of 
the conglomerate term of outsourcing20.   
 
2.4 Differentiation between outsourcing and privatization 
 
The terms privatization and outsourcing have a great resemblance and are often 
confused as both have the shift of a previously task to third-party provider in 
common. In order to draw a line between them the following abstract presents the 
differences in detail: 
 
Privatization describes the situation under which the government is shifting former 
federal activities to the private sector. Thereby it loses the ownership and control of 
those by exempting itself of the commercial function, including the associated real 
property, and thus becomes a buyer of services and goods from a private source21. 
The main reason for privatization can be found in the inefficiency of state-owned 
enterprises that often caused major debts for governments. By pushing those off 
nations get rid of uneconomic firms as well as they acquire capital through the sale. 
Of course also several negative aspects, such as the loss of jobs, can occur when a 
state company is sold to the private sector. 
 
When the government outsources a function or an activity, a private contractor is 
awarded to provide it, yet the government retains the ownership, control and 
responsibility of that operation22. Summing up, the main difference between 
privatization and outsourcing lies in the exertion of influence on the function that got 
transferred to a third-party provider: While governments cannot impinge on 
privatized companies, they still are able to control outsourced tasks.  
 
                                                
17 Comp. Börnecke (2003), p.64 
18 Comp. Bruch (1998), p.11ff. 
19 Comp. Withers (2000), p.38 
20 Comp. Hopfenbeck (2002), p.719 
21 Bartz (2003), p.351 
22 Comp. Federal Aviation Administration (2004), http://www.faa.gov 
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3 History of outsourcing 
3.1 In general means 
 
 
Although outsourcing has been performed since almost two centuries, it became a 
massive trend only in the end of the 20th century. Already in the 1830s outsourcing 
was used to minimize production costs:  
 
At that time, Indian cloth makers transferred their work from India to England, where 
the textile industry was more efficient and cheaper. As a consequence numerous 
Indian workers became jobless and William Bentinck, back then India’s governor 
general stated that "the misery hardly finds parallel in the history of commerce23”. 
More than a hundred years later, many countries had to face financial troubles and 
started to privatize state properties, enterprises and other assets as well as they 
began to outsource functions that were considered being too costly if they would 
have been provided by federal facilities in the future. Soon private enterprises 
followed this trend and commenced to transfer loss involving tasks to third-party 
providers which were more skilled in the respective activities.  
 
Another main driver for the rapid prevalence of outsourcing can be found in the 
boom of the internet-branch in the mid 1990s, the so-called new economy. 
Increased competition as a reason of the upcoming of thousands of new firms at 
that time forced companies to consider new business methods in order to stay alive 
on the highly competitive market. Outsourcing was one of them as it yielded above 
all lower costs, greater efficiency and the possibility to concentrate on core-
competencies. Nevertheless the major stimulus for outsourcing has always been 
and will always remain the cost advantage that this unique process mostly creates24. 
 
3.2 In military means 
 
Along with the decline of countries’ financial capabilities also defense budgets 
shrank at the end of the last century and similarly as in commercial business also 
armed forces got confronted with outsourcing processes which were implemented 
as cost saving measures25. However transferring defense operations to private 
contractors is not a novelty as it was executed by several empires, rulers and 
countries already centuries ago. 
 
Especially the hiring of paid foreign forces has been very popular for ages.  
Macedonians got paid for fighting for the Greeks who were well known for 
contracting outside-defense specialists and also the Roman Empire hired vast 
                                                
23 Davis (2004), in: The Arizona Daily Star (2004) 
24 Comp. Verhulst (2005), p.4 
25 Comp. Wulf (2003) 
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contingents of mercenaries for their security26. William the Conqueror employed 
hundreds of mercenaries during the invasion of Britain and during the Renaissance 
Italian city-states used so called condottieri, which were privately-run armies who 
offered their services, the provision of security27, to the highest bidder28. At that time 
mercenaries constituted a very important factor for many armies and got employed 
for several wars throughout Europe29. According to Singer, “by the end of the 
fourteenth century privately organized units had largely taken over the field of battle 
form their feudal predecessors30”. Only when Napoleon started his battles at the end 
of the 18th century, the number of mercenaries decreased. The reason for this 
change lay in the altered nature of warfare at that time when mass armies and their 
numerical advantage were a key factor in the success of armed conflicts. 
Furthermore, the problem of having a constantly installed army was then solved with 
the implementation of taxation as well as the reliance on hired individual fighters 
strongly decreased. Also, the sentiment of patriotism and state-identity arose 
throughout the people and led to a situation in which “people were more willing to 
fight as citizens than as subjects31”. Finally, the advent of bureaucratic states and 
their smart leaders led to powerful regimens and strengthened them against outside 
powers. By the beginning of the 20th century mercenaries and the international 
private military market were widely pushed back and those individuals who decided 
to fight for foreign leaders or governments, for instance in the 1950s and 1960s 
during the decolonization period, were rather motivated by their adventurous spirit 
than by any other goal32.  
 
Besides scattered individual mercenaries, legitimate units of soldiers being hired 
and paid by foreign governments still exist. Examples include the Gurkha fighters 
which are Nepalese citizens that act in behalf of Great Britain since 1947 and the 
French Foreign Legion that consists of many nationalities and was founded in 
183133.  
 
3.3 In the U.S. Army 
 
As the last chapter concentrated on the history of military outsourcing in general and 
mainly portrayed European examples, information on the U.S. defense’ outsourcing 
past and its recent boom is given in the following. 
 
                                                
26 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.21 
27 Comp. Fellow (2000) 
28 Comp. Smith (2002), p.105 
29 Comp. Shearer (1998), p.13 
30 Singer (2003a), p.23 
31 Singer (2003a), p.31 
32 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.37 
33 Comp. Shearer (1998), p.16 
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Under the tenure of the first president George Washington, the United States hired 
civilian contractors, more precisely farmers, to forward goods to the Continental 
Army already in the late 18th century34.  
 
The steep incline in the use of outsourcing in the U.S. Army in the recent past was 
mainly caused by a revolutionary document, the so called Circular No. A-76 which 
was established in 1966 and re-issued during the Reagan era in 1983. It patronized 
the commitment to private contractors which should substitute federal production 
and services in areas where it would make economical sense. 
 
 
Article 5.c. of this document states the following:  
 
“Rely on the Commercial Sector. The Federal Government shall 
rely on commercially available sources to provide commercial 
products and services. In accordance with the provisions of this 
Circular, the Government shall not start or carry on any activity 
to provide a commercial product or service if the product or 
service can be procured more economically from a commercial 
source35.”  
 
Even though Circular No. A-76 was not merely aimed at the U.S. Department of 
Defense, it was the military on which it had the most impact. Nevertheless it still took 
almost ten years until the U.S. government contracted out a part of its tasks in 1991 
to BRS, a private company, using the first of meanwhile three LOGCAP contracts. 
 
There are two coherent main reasons for this change in military policy: First, 
abridged defense budgets bludgeoned the government to save financial funds and 
second, as a consequence of those savings, mass dismissals led to a surplus of 
highly qualified military staff that soon got employed by newly established private 
military companies. The latter welcomed them with open arms, due to their 
experience in this sector and paid them much more than the army ever was able 
to36. 
 
The following graph illustrates the downturn in the U.S. defense budget after the end 
of the Cold War that particularly led to the boom in PMCs: 
 
 
                                                
34 Comp. Baum (2003) 
35 OMB Circular No. A-76 (1983), Article 5.c. 
36 Comp. Wulf (2003) 
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Figure 3: U.S. Military Spending 1945 -2008 (estimation)37
 
Downsizing the number of its soldiers did not mean that the skills of those men were 
not valuable any more. On the contrary, the Pentagon back then needed - and 
nowadays still needs - the skills of its former personnel due to the rise in conflicts 
with participation of the U.S. Army, e.g. in the Balkans in the 1990s and the war on 
terror that started at the advent of the third millennium. The only difference to 
previous years was that the armed forces bought the products and services they 
had manufactured themselves in the past from the private sector. 
 
Defense expert Dan Baum underlines the persistent growth in U.S. participation in 
conflicts by stating the following: 
 
“By one count, the Army has deployed soldiers more than three 
times as often in the 14 years since the cold war ended than in 
the cold war's four-decade history, even though it is today down 
to only two-thirds the size of its cold war peak38.” 
 
 
The first activities that were shifted from the public to the private sector included 
training of personnel, service of cars, maintenance of IT-systems and education of 
soldiers39. Therefore it was no wonder that the more activities the U.S. Army 
outsourced, the steeper turnovers of private military companies increased. A 
comparison between the second and the third Gulf War shows that the ration 
between U.S. Army soldiers and PMC employees shifted in favor of the latter: 
 
                                                
37 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (2003) 
38 Baum (2003) 
39 Comp. Wulf (2003) 
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Figure 4: Comparison of troop level and PMCs force in the 2nd and 3rd Gulf War40
 
 
During the second Gulf War in 1991 the army sent around 400.00041 soldiers to Iraq 
and Kuwait, in 2003, during the third Gulf War, the troops shrank to an estimated 
number between 138.00042 and 150.00043. However in 1991 the ratio of military 
personnel and private contractors at the Iraqi war scene was 100:1; in 2003 it 
climbed to 1:1044. This development implies that the fewer soldiers are deployed, 
the more private contractors act in today’s armed conflicts45.  
 
 
Note only the given numbers confirm the importance of defense outsourcing today 
also several military analysts are convinced that contracting out already is a 
common practice in many armies: 
 
“There is no doubt that outsourcing the US-Army is a big issue these days and more 
important than it ever was in the history of the US-Army” says Paula Rebar, a senior 
pentagon analyst. She adds that “though we've relied on contractors forever, it's 
unprecedented how much we depend on them right now46”. John Hamre, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration says: "Contractors are 
                                                
40 Modelled after data from SCN (2004), http://www.scn.org, Bredemeier (2003) and 
Schmitt (2005)  
41 Comp. SCN (2004) 
42 Comp. Hess, P. (2004) 
43 Comp. Schmitt (2005) 
44 Comp. Bredemeier (2003) 
45 Comp. Schwartz (2003) 
46 Rebar (2003) in Schwartz (2003) 
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indispensable …Will there be more in the future? Yes, and they are not just running 
the soup kitchens47".  
 
Even in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report it is stated “that contracting out 
battlefield services will become as common as hiring private companies to build 
tanks ... and … the rate between private and public contractors for activities within 
the Department of Defense will continue to rise 48“. Finally Misser, O’Meara and 
Peckenpaugh argue that the U.S. Government plans to outsource more than 
200.000 jobs in the support area to private contractors until 200649. 
 
 
                                                
47 Hamre (2002), quoted in: Wayne (2002) 
48 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p.11  
49 Comp. Misser (2003), O’Meara (2002) and Peckenpaugh (2002) 
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4 Reasons for outsourcing 
4.1 Reasons for outsourcing in the private sector 
 
The potentiality of cost savings is the most common perception why companies 
perform outsourcing. Nevertheless, many other reasons for the trend in contracting 
out specific functions or even entire parts of a business exist. 
 
“Do what you can do best – outsource the rest50” 
 
The statement above underlines the business trend to concentrating on core-
competencies. As financial and also human resources are very limited in most 
companies, it is utmost important to have them inset in most value-adding areas. By 
shifting non-core tasks - which are defined as functions that are not inherently 
connected to a company’s main business51 - to third-party providers resources from 
those activities can be redirected to the core business to which is referred to as a 
strategic part of business that dominates competition in a market and heavily 
contributes to a company’s increase in value52. The release from peripheral tasks 
and the reinforcement of core tasks can also prevent companies from competitors 
trying to overtake them due to a stronger commitment to their main-business and 
thereby a better market position. Freed resources also allow a stronger focus on the 
actual business as operational activities get performed by a contractor and therefore 
more funds can be used for strategic and management tasks. Particularly because 
of recent changes in the nature of the market, e.g. the intensified use of IT and e-
commerce in well-nigh all branches of business, and enhanced competitive pressure 
organizations require great flexibility and perfect dealing with complex actuality. 
Focusing on the core-business makes companies more flexible, more dynamic and 
better able to change themselves to meet changing opportunities.  
 
A further reason for the popularity of outsourcing nowadays is simply the lack of 
resources or know-how within a company. It enables companies to offer services 
they otherwise could not provide. According to the theorem of transaction costs 
outsourcing a product or process is justified whenever a task is too complicated and 
specified for an entity to perform it itself or when it is performed too seldom to start 
an own department or staff position for it. Furthermore, outsourcing is used when 
only little or no advantage in a specific knowledge within an organization exists so 
that it has to be yielded by a different source53. Especially when a company is 
growing very fast, outsourcing can be a good solution, as often financial resources 
are too limited to be able to start a new department or operational unit in those times 
of expansion.  
 
                                                
50 Voss/Chalupsky (1995), p.67, quoted: in Bruch (1998), p.39 
51 Comp. Köhler-Frost (1998), p.12 
52 Comp. Hinterhuber & Friedrich (1995), p.296, quoted in: Bruch (1998), p.13 
53 Comp. Thommen & Achleitner (2003), p.783 
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Using third-party providers also introduces the contractor to know-how and expertise 
it would have never been able to gain by itself. Outsourcing specialist companies 
have state-of-the-art personnel and equipment at their disposal and can perfectly 
inset these resources for their clients who profit from the access to newest 
technologies and skills without the need of anteing up vast amounts of money. This 
method furthermore gives a company a competitive edge without assuming 
unpredictable risks as it offers the opportunity to share ventures with the contracted 
enterprise.  
 
When outsourcing is performed the relationship between the outsourcing entity and 
the new provider mostly improves and surmounts those of a normal supplier-client 
situation in which merely money is the consideration for the provision of a service. 
Outsourcing means externalizing specific areas on a strategic prolonged basis and 
not simply contracting out one single task for a short period. Therefore both parties 
involved in an outsourcing process are interested in a long-lasting and confident 
cooperation that leads to increased mutual loyalty, involvement and an enhanced 
supplier-client relationship to which can be referred to as a win-win-situation54. The 
third-party provider does not only get paid for its services, it also gains greater 
insight into the contracting-out company’s field of expertise and contingently both 
are together able to establish a policy, procedure or process that is trend-setting in 
the branch and can be sold to other entities. 
 
Summing up, outsourcing, if properly performed, is not merely a make-or-buy 
decision but leads to cost saving, relief of peripheral tasks and a stronger 
commitment to core-competencies. Furthermore, the use of external know-how 
widens the array of services and products as well as it helps to master innovations 
and improves the competitive edge55. 
 
  
4.2 Reasons for outsourcing in the U.S. Army 
 
Concentration on core-competencies, cost-saving intentions and lack of 
technologies are all private business reasons for outsourcing, yet also valid for 
contracting out measures within the U.S. Army. Although outsourcing is mostly used 
throughout private entities, it is still not limited to them. Also public institutions, such 
as the U.S. Army, are convinced that they can save costs and improve efficiency by 
focusing on their core competencies and outsourcing functions which are not 
considered being part of their core-business. Distinguishing core and non-core 
competencies in defense operations is not easy as these two areas often closely 
cohere. John Withers defines core competencies as 
 
 
                                                
54 Comp. Bruch (1998), p.14ff. 
55 Comp. Bruch (1998), p.39 
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“… the minimum depot size and composition (personnel, skills, 
and plant equipment) required to support the most intense 
combination of contingencies specified in the Defense Planning 
Guidance56”. 
 
 
In 1995 half of the defense budget consisted of such non-core activities. Examples 
of those tasks include maintenance, supply, health care, data processing, 
administrative services, facilities management, transportation and others. According 
to defense expert Loren B. Thompson the Department of Defense could save more 
than US$10 billion annually if they had performed even half of their non-core 
functions by private contractors. Using them for support functions should also 
improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the defense infrastructure. Thompson 
even suggests that privatization could be the most important defense management 
initiative of the post-Cold War period57. The following graph shall lighten up the 
mentioned differences in the performance of military activities when outsourcing is 
performed. It shows the changed allocation of duties after a distinction between core 
and non-core functions is made. The latter are contracted out to Private Military 
Companies which are then in charge of determined tasks: 
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Figure 5: Outsourcing’s influence on the allocation of duties58
                                                
56 Withers (2000), p.38 
57 Comp. Thompson (1996) 
58 Figure created by the author  
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Also the Defense Science Board, a civilian advisory panel for the Department of 
Defense, came to the conclusion that the department should focus on war-fighting 
policy and oversight activities and leave all other tasks to outside providers59. Even 
the former Deputy Secretary of Defense John White said that  
 
“… outsourcing and privatization can provide a critical means of 
obtaining increased funding for the modernization of the 
Department of Defense’s military equipment and systems60” 
 
Another Pentagon analyst, Loren B. Thompson of the Alexis de Tocqueville 
Institution, underlines the necessity of outsourcing. She says that the U.S. Army has 
traditionally performed all activities necessary for war internally yet due to budget 
pressures and the impressive performance of private-sector firms the Pentagon has 
to rethink that premise. Furthermore, she thinks that big private companies usually 
achieve cost savings of 20 to 30 percent when they outsource non-core functions, 
such as accountants, attorneys or computer technicians61.  
 
Finally, also U.S. Army officials admit to outsourcing measures. The Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment, Mahlon Apgar IV, says that 
independent third-party enterprises can handle support services “faster, better or 
cheaper than Army organizations can provide in-house62”. John Withers of the U.S. 
Army Logistics Management College adds that 
 
“… outsourcing thus can be an attractive strategy for the 
Department of Defense as it works to create a smaller, more 
lethal, and more flexible military force during a time of 
decreasing funding63”. 
 
Col. Thomas W. Sweeney, a professor of strategic logistics at the Army War College 
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, says that "the main reason for using a contractor is that it 
saves you from having to use troops, so troops can focus on war fighting64".  
                                                
59 Comp. Withers (2000), p.40 
60 White (2000), quoted in: Withers (2000), p.40 
61 Comp. Peckenpaugh (2002) 
62 Apgar (1999), http://aec.army.mil/  
63 Withers (2000), p.40 
64 Sweeney (2002), quoted in: Wayne (2002) 
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Concerning the U.S. Army another cogent reason for the heavy use of outsourcing of 
public operations today exists: The decline in the U.S. defense budget’s brought to 
light a very troubled issue: the weak military procurement. Assertions that fraud, 
abuse and waste were made as well as scandals of very expensive weapons that 
underperformed led to public deprecation over government’s defense spending. A 
major reason for this situation was the non-existence of competitive bidding and the 
disrespect of private market forces in this area65. Therefore outsourcing as a 
consequence of competition in public tenders enjoys popularity and is respected as 
an efficient method of cost-saving procurement. Additionally the U.S. Government 
anticipates several further positive effects by contracting out non-core tasks. Above 
all it hopes to 
• avoid capital expenditures  
• increase flexibility 
• focus on core business 
• improve productivity  
• avoid labor problems 
• reduce large staffs66 
 
Summing up, it can be said that outsourcing within the U.S. Army is not seen as a 
trend anymore. This method of procurement and performance of services has 
provided great success in the past and represents common practice nowadays.  
 
                                                
65 Comp. Kennedy (1987), p.522 
66 Comp. Withers (2000), p.40 
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5 Private Military Companies 
5.1 Definition PMCs 
 
Establishing a definition for Private Military Companies is not easy as their tasks are 
reaching far and differ from firm to firm and from contract to contract. Even more 
troubled appears their and their employees’ delimitation from mercenaries67. Latter 
are defined as soldiers that are “paid to fight by a country or group that he or she 
does not belong to68”. As already mentioned earlier in this paper a broad definition 
would for instance include Ghurkha Fighters, an elite troop of the British Army, the 
Vatican’s Swiss Guard and the French Foreign Legion, all military units that are 
legally implemented in nation’s defense systems.  
 
Several national and international documents were set up in order to establish a 
legal framework concerning private military actors yet none was appropriate enough 
to be effective. More detailed information on legal aspects is given in chapter seven. 
Considering the complex situation, it is very complicated to draw an exact line 
between the terms mercenary and PMC. However, several experts on the private 
military branch and a private military actor itself established definitions for PMC: 
 
Military analyst Peter Singer of Washington’s Brookings Institute defines private 
military companies as  
 
 
"profit-driven organizations that trade in professional services 
intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate bodies that 
specialize in the provision of military skills—including tactical 
combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and 
analysis, operational support, troop training, and military 
technical assistance69."  
 
 
David Shearer’s definition is quite similar: 
 
“These companies are distinct from organizations operating in 
other areas of the security industry in that they are designed to 
have a strategic impact on the security and political 
environments of weak states facing a significant military threat. 
The activities of military companies often include military 
assessments and training as well as, occasionally, supplying 
equipment to a state’s security forces70.” 
 
 
Another definition is provided by Sandline Inc., a PMC: 
                                                
67 Comp. Shearer (1998), p.12 
68 Collins Cobuild English Dictionary (1995) 
69 Singer (2002) 
70 Shearer (1998), p.23 
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“…PMCs are defined as those organisations which do more than 
provide passive assistance in areas of conflict.  They may 
provide training and equipment to extend the capabilities of their 
clients military resources, providing them with the strategic or 
operational advantage that is necessary to suppress their 
opposition or, going even further, play an active role alongside 
the client forces, as force multipliers, deploying their own 
personnel into the field of conflict, but with the strict caveat that 
they are acting within the chain of command of the clients 
military hierarchy71.” 
 
 
 
Taking instanced definitions into consideration, it can be determined that PMCs offer 
a wide spectrum of numerous different services in the area of military activities. 
Their tasks reach from quite safe consulting jobs to dangerous combat missions. In 
this branch small firms as well as multinational companies are active and employ 
thousands of laborers. A further characteristic is that PMCs are not merely operating 
in one single contract and are afterwards closed down. They work like any other 
private business with continuous structures on the long-term goal of reaching 
profit72. 
 
Summing up the many given definitions it becomes clear that PMCs’ working 
spectra are broadly based and therefore an overarching concept of its tasks is not 
easy to set up. On that score defense experts pigeonholed the genus Private 
Military Company in different terms that are more thorough portrayed in chapter 5.5. 
 
 
5.2 General information 
 
The last chapter informed about some PMCs being considered suppliers of services 
that have formerly been yielded by mercenaries73. Of course this opinion negatively 
reflects on businesses and therefore many attempted to improve their image. As the 
private military branch realizes that its activities depend on a positive image in the 
public, due to the reason that barely any institution or government is eager to 
contract a company that is in a bad repute, some of them appear with openness. 
They do not try to hide their sometimes legally sketchy operations. On the contrary 
they head for the public in order to show them the conditions and standards of their 
work.  
 
                                                
71 Sandline (1998), http://www.sandline.com 
72 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.73 ff. 
73 Comp. Avant (2000) 
 21
Some PMCs even have websites giving vast information about their business, hold 
press conferences and grant interviews. They snatch every opportunity for image 
cultivation in order to get away from the mercenary cliché.  
 
Sandline Inc., a PMC that announced its closure on its homepage in April 2004, tries 
to dissociate from mercenaries by setting up certain principles of PMCs: 
 
 
 
• They have a public persona in the form of a corporate identity. 
 
• They work out of or have representative offices in first world countries. 
 
• They abide by a stated code of conduct. 
 
• They are selective about the clients for whom they will work. 
 
• Their personnel operate to the standards of first world armies. 
 
• Their operating principles are strictly applied. 
 
• They work within the framework of national and international laws. 
 
• They are prepared to be regulated74. 
 
 
It is very apparent that Sandline wants to gain public confidence from its operations 
with this self defined code of conduct. The company also offers many documents on 
private military activities in general on its homepage. Surprisingly such articles with 
negative impact on PMCs or those with criticizing views are not excluded and can as 
well be downloaded. Sandline credits itself as different to mercenary groupings as 
“apes are to man75”.  
 
A highlight is the homepage of ICI Oregon, a U.S. PMC that performs military 
training programs for many public U.S. institutions, respectively United States 
Special Forces and other federal agencies. It gives detailed information about its 
training programs and provides the viewer with picture galleries as well as 
downloadable videos showing combat training missions where the inset of real 
munitions is more than flaring. ICI Oregon describes their field of activity as follows: 
 
 
”ICI Security & Training provides a myriad of training and 
security services worldwide. Our Special Operations qualified 
instructors have years of military and civilian experience as 
operators and trainers in some of the world's most high risk 
environments. 
                                                
74 Comp. Sandline (1999), http://www.sandline.com 
75 Sandline (1999), http://www.sandline.com 
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ICI Instructors have extensive experience in conducting dynamic 
training programs and operations in high risk environments 
throughout the world. The ICI Training Division develops, plans, 
coordinates and facilitates training to U.S. Federal Agencies, 
U.S. Military Special Operations Forces, Non-Governmental 
Organizations, corporate clients, and foreign clients through the 
U.S. Department of State. 
ICI Security and Training is dedicated to supporting our clients 
with training programs and operational support that enable them 
to execute their missions and objectives effectively, safely and 
efficiently76.” 
 
On the other hand there are PMCs that do not particularly point out their activities. 
Exemplarily Halliburton Corporation’s webpage looks like any other major private 
business internet presence and does not concentrate on its “support tasks that allow 
troops and government clients to focus on their primary mission77”.   
 
Peter Singer calls PMCs a “corporate evolution of old-fashioned mercenaries — that 
is, they provide the service side of war rather than weapons78”. Some hundreds of 
them account for total revenue of more than US$100 billion a year. Furthermore 
they are active in at least 50 countries on the whole world and have contracts with 
governments as well as with various other institutions and groups. 
 
Most of these private firms are led by former military officers and call themselves 
consultants rather than mercenaries to avoid a negative image.  
 
Christopher Hellman, senior analyst at the Centre for Defense Information, a military 
research organization in Washington, D.C. says that “the American private military 
firms are poised to do huge business. They have the connections, and the Pentagon 
has made it clear it wants to outsource operations79.”  
A statement by Deborah Avant, an associate professor of political science at George 
Washington University in Washington, D.C. underlines the importance of military 
outsourcing in the future: “It's politically unfeasible to increase the size of America's 
uniformed military, so the Pentagon is going to depend on private companies80.” 
 
 
 
                                                
76 ICI Oregon (2004), http://www.icitraining.com 
77 Halliburton (2004), http://www.halliburton.com 
78 Singer (2003b) 
79 Hellman (2003), quoted in: Kurlantzick (2003a)
80 Avant (2003), quoted in: Kurlantzick (2003a) 
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5.3 Ownership of PMCs 
 
Nowadays most PMCs are parts of huge multinational enterprises, structured like 
any other private corporation having head offices with CEOs and publicly held stock 
which can be traded at world’s biggest stock exchanges like any other shares81. 
MPRI for instance is owned by L3-Communications, an U.S. company that produces 
secure communication systems and other military high-tech equipment and 
DynCorp is owned by CSC, a software and IT-infrastructure provider. BRS, amongst 
the biggest private military companies, is owned by Halliburton, one of the largest 
oilfield services firms and listed at the NYSE (Symbol: HAL). Its performance since 
the beginning of the second Iraq War, which was on March 20th 2003, is 
outstanding: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Stock Chart Halliburton 2003-200482
 
 
In less than a year Halliburton’s stock value increased by 50%, a fact that does not 
surprise when the number and size of contracts the company was awarded by the 
U.S. Government for operations at the third Gulf War is considered.  
 
 
 
5.4 PMC employees 
 
As already mentioned most companies that compete for U.S. Army outsourcing 
contracts have at least some military background. There are many reasons for that, 
yet the most important is that employees with a military background bring in great 
experience and knowledge into private military companies. Not only they know how 
                                                
81 Comp. Volkery (2002) 
82 Modelled after Nasdaq (2004), http://www.nasdaq.com 
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defense functions are exactly performed but also they are aware of problems and 
accurate needs within the army. These employees do not all have a past in the U.S. 
Army as they are compiled of many nationals from various countries, including the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Nepal, Israel or Zimbabwe. Wherever 
former soldiers ranking from privates to generals are recruited from they play an 
essential role in many PMCs. Many reasons for this peculiarity exist. 
 
First, in the recent years a lot of armies decreased the number of its troops by 
dismissing its personnel which led to a bulk of unemployed military-trained workers. 
Secondly, also militaries’ employees quitted from their jobs as they were dissatisfied 
with their employment and low wages. Third, PMCs search for skilled personnel and 
this cannot be found better than in former active army employees. MPRI, a Virginia, 
U.S., based PMC, underlines the need in ex-soldiers, describing itself as a “dynamic 
company with expanding requirements for top quality former military and law 
enforcement personnel83” on its homepage. 
 
The biography of Tim Spicer, head of the British PMC Aegis Defense Services, who 
was awarded a US$293 million contract in 2004 from the U.S. Government to 
protect U.S. diplomats in Iraq, represents a paradigm for an ex-soldier’s career in 
the private military branch84: 
Spicer is a former member of the Scot Guards85, a British military elite unit, and was 
involved in the Northern Ireland conflict where two soldiers under his command shot 
a Catholic child and got convicted of murder in 1992. Spicer defended them and 
even argued for their innocence. Paul O'Connor of the Pat Finucane Centre, a 
human rights group in Northern Ireland, describes Spicer as follows: "As 
commander in Belfast, Tim Spicer believed his soldiers were above the law and he 
disputed their convictions for murder86". In 1997 the government of Papua New 
Guinea paid Spicer US$36 million in order to have him and seventy other 
mercenaries stave off a rebellion. When the Papuan army learned about this deal, 
Spicer got arrested and expelled from the country. Only a year later again he was 
involved in a politically charged scandal when Sandline International, a company he 
founded and ran, imported numerous weapons to Sierra Leone, contravening a UN 
arms embargo.  
Waiving Spicer’s shady past, the Pentagon awarded his company with a huge 
contract that was based on a costs plus basis, meaning that also higher than 
negotiated costs would still bring profit to Aegis Defense Services. Being aware of 
Spicer’s past five Democratic senators protested against the contract and as a 
consequence then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reviewed it. Even though he 
admitted unawareness in some of its parts he did not reconsider the contract87. 
                                                
83 MPRI (2004), http://www.mpri.com 
84 Comp. Ackerman (2004) 
85 Comp. Barnett and Bright (2004) 
86 O’Connor (2004), quoted in: Fitzgerald (2004) 
87 Comp. Ackerman (2004) 
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Sandra Sieber director of the U.S. Army Contracting Agency explained that no legal 
basis was given to refuse to contract Spicer’s company: “neither Aegis nor Mr. 
Spicer are on the ... list of parties excluded from Federal contracting88”. It is utmost 
important to say that back then the Government Accountability Office had not made 
a background check of Tim Spicer, although competitors that lost against Aegis 
claimed to have it performed. Nevertheless, Spicer has a different point of view. In 
1998 when he still was CEO of Sandline International he claimed for its proper 
business policy: 
 
 
“At Sandline, we maintain a strict, self-imposed code of conduct. 
We will only work for legitimate governments, those recognised 
by the UN. We then apply our own moral template. We would 
not work for the pariah governments like Iraq and turned down 
President Mobutu of Zaire. … We look at issues like criminality, 
human rights and corruption and we make a decision from 
there89.”  
 
 
 
As Spicer’s example illustrates, military experience and sometimes also connections 
to highest political circles are a key factor to PMCs’ success. Therefore these 
companies will go on with the recruitment of former soldiers that bring along the 
skills and knowledge vital for their future operations.  
 
 
5.5 Different kinds of PMCs 
 
 
As already mentioned in previous chapters, almost no PMC is similar to another 
one, as such companies’ tasks and contracts largely vary. Some firms merely 
provide the housekeeping for military facilities whereas others are directly involved 
in combat missions. Furthermore they differ in the regions and conflicts they operate 
in as well as in the legitimacy of their contracts90. 
 
In order to be able to distinguish different kinds of companies in this branch, several 
experts redefined the term PMC or replaced it by new ones. The most common 
differentiation was drafted by defense analyst Peter Singer who discerns between 
Military Provider Firms, Military Consultant Firms and Military Support Firms91. He 
calls his definition Tip-of-the-spear typology, referring to companies’ different 
proximity to a conflicts’ front line that “result in implications in their training levels, 
unit prestige, roles in the battle, directness of impact, and so on92”. 
                                                
88 Sieber (2004), quoted in: Ackerman (2004) 
89 Spicer (1998) 
90 Comp. Kurlantzick (2003a) 
91 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.68 
92 Singer (2003a), p.91 
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Assuming that Singer’s typology is the most distinct one, this paper further 
concentrates on his findings. The following graph gives a first overview on Singer’s 
three types of PMCs: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Types of PMCs and their different tasks and activities93
 
 
As mentioned before, the big difference between these typologies is found in their 
distance to the actual theatre of war. While Military Support Firms mainly supply 
non-lethal aid, such as transportation, Military Consultant Firms already act in a 
more dangerous environment offering combat and target practices for troops. 
Finally, Military Provider Firms are established at the ceiling of dangerousness as 
some of their missions even include the operation of combat planes in warfare.  
 
The proximate chapters elaborate Singer’s three different types of PMCs, 
enumerate examples of companies acting in these parts of the defense business as 
well as portray typologies established by Shearer 94 and Weingartner95. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
93 Modelled after Singer (2003a), p.93 
94 Comp. Shearer (1998), p.23ff. 
95 Comp. Weingartner (2004) 
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5.5.1 Military Support Firms (MSFs) 
 
Military Support Firms are companies that do not actively participate in warfare but 
rather provide supplementary tasks. Therefore they might be credited as the softest 
sector within the bandwidth of PMCs. Nevertheless their work is in any case very 
important as logistical tasks are essential for successful participation in armed 
conflicts. As the term logistics is broadly based and applicable for a lot of various 
tasks within the world of business a definition is needful. Warner defines it as 
“activities required to plan and carry out the movement of goods and material or 
manufacturing source to the point of consumption96”. Another definition offers the 
Council of Logistics Management, the major logistics professional organization in 
the United States:  
 
“…the process of planning, implementing and controlling the 
efficient, effective flow and storage of goods, services and 
related information from the point of origin to the point of 
consumption for the purposes of conforming to customer 
requirements97.” 
 
In military means the term logistics particularly services for the planning and 
executing of force sustainment in support of military operations. That, for instance, 
includes the construction of military housing for the troops, transporting food and 
supplies to military bases and serving food at military cafeterias. Furthermore 
logistic tasks within the defense sector encompass the provisioning, maintenance 
and transportation of army equipment and personnel. The following list presents 
those logistical functions that are typically provided by MSFs98: 
 
 
• Engineering, construction 
• Base camp operations and maintenance 
• Structure maintenance, transportation services 
• Road repair and vehicle maintenance 
• Equipment maintenance 
• Cargo Handling and railhead operation 
• Water production and distribution 
• Food services, laundry operations, mail delivery 
• Clothing exchange and clothing repair 
• Power generation, refueling 
• Hazardous material and environmental services 
• Staging and onward-movement operations 
• Fire fighting, petroleum, oil and lubricants provision 
• Personal demand items, medical Supplies 
• Recreational services 
                                                
96 Warner (1996a), p.2571 
97 Council of Logistics Management (1995), quoted in: Warner (1996a), p.2571 
98 Comp. Ehab, Cox, DeLorme, Lanclos (1999), quoted in: Singer (2003a), p.144 
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Due to shrinking defense budgets armies had to save costs and reasonably they 
started to do so in areas which were less respected to be core of their work. As a 
consequence, logistic units shrank or were outsourced yet remained to be very 
important for any unit. 
 
The tasks numerated in the table above attach importance to the necessity of a 
perfect functioning logistics system in armies as they could not start any campaign 
without these functions. Additionally also several politicians, military experts and 
leaders underscore that a logistic system is crucial for any army: 
 
"Logistics…as vital to military success as daily food is to daily 
work99."  
(Military strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan) 
 
 
“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and 
even wars have been won or lost primarily because of 
logistics100.”  
(General Dwight D. Eisenhower) 
 
 
“Since the dawn of military history, logistical capabilities have 
controlled size, scope, pace, and effectiveness of military 
operations … Logistical capabilities must be designed to survive 
and operate under attack; that is, they must be designed for 
combat effectiveness, not peacetime efficiency101.”  
(U.S. Military Doctrine) 
 
"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study 
logistics102." 
(General Robert H. Barrow) 
 
 
Especially the last statement displays that Military Support Firms are not less 
important compared to Military Provider Firms that directly participate in combat. 
 
The reasons for the magnitude of contracting out logistics to third-party providers in 
defense operations are manifold. First of all, outsourcing such tasks allows the army 
to focus on its core-competency of combat. Here the maxim of what is often called 
“do what you can do best – outsource the rest” fully applies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
99 Thayer Mahan, quoted in: U.S. Air Force, Logistics Group (2004), 
http://www.arftsm.ang.af.mil 
100 Eisenhower, quoted in: Logisticsworld (2004), http://www.logisticsworld.com  
101 U.S. Military Doctrine (1992) 
102 Barrow (1980) 
 29
The U.S. Army describes the advantage of outsourcing its logistical tasks as follows: 
 
 
“Utilization of civilian contractors in a theater of operation will 
release military units for other missions or fill shortfalls. This 
provides the Army with an additional means to adequately 
support the current and programmed force103.” 
 
 
In many recent wars more and more specified intelligence about the infrastructure at 
the scenes of war is crucial for smooth logistics. This includes information on the 
provision of water, food and fuel or on ports, airports and means of transportation.  
 
Often armies outsource tasks as mentioned above to multinational companies as 
they have superior knowledge of local conditions, due to the existence of a lot of sub-
businesses104 in many countries and other multilateral co-operations, as well as more 
experience in their respective area in which they are market leader or mounted with 
state-of-the-art equipment and up to date state of knowledge105. These abilities 
facilitate Military Support Firms to acquire goods and supply transports from and 
together with local partners. Those procedures result in cost savings for both, the 
private providers and equally for defense budgets. Furthermore, the increasing 
number of conflicts with multinational participation, e.g. multilateral troops in U.N. or 
NATO forces, poses the problem of different equipment and procedures in the 
various vested armies that can only be solved with proper logistics. 
 
An example of a recent international MSF mission that did not involve the U.S. Army 
presents the Saudi Arabian army that contracted private U.S. companies taking over 
training for troops and maintenance support in the second Gulf War at the beginning 
of the 1990s. The contractors went along into the conflict with the Saudi troops in 
order to give tactical advice when it was needed. Without a third-party help the Saudi 
Arabian force is said to have been far less effective in this conflict106.  
 
Another paradigm for the demand in MSFs is found in the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), a government initiative that involves and lifts the 
civil participation in defense logistics. The U.S. Army specifies the content of this 
program that was founded in 1985 as follows: 
 
“The U.S. Army continually seeks to increase its combat 
potential within programmed resource allocations. This 
occasionally requires pursuit of external sources to provide 
adequate logistics support for the force. 
                                                
103 U.S. Army, LOGCAP (1985), p.iii 
104 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.138 
105 Comp. Goodpaster (1996) 
106 Comp. Milton (1997) 
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LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative for peacetime planning for the 
use of civilian contractors in wartime and other contingencies. 
These contractors will perform selected services to support U.S. 
forces in support of Department of Defense (DoD) missions.  
Use of contractors in a theater of operations allows the release 
of military units for other missions or to fill support shortfalls. 
This program provides the Army with additional means to 
adequately support the current and programmed forces107.” 
 
 
Although LOGCAP was initially implemented to merely support the U.S. Army, its 
resources were later also used for multinational operations such as NATO or United 
Nation forces. Furthermore the program was, and still is, in charge of both, war-time 
missions as well as peace-time humanitarian aid assignments108.  
 
In 1992 the U.S. government and then Secretary of Defense Richard “Dick” Cheney, 
awarded Brown Root Services (BRS), a subsidiary of Halliburton Inc., one of the 
world largest oil field services companies, a US$ 3.9 million contract under which 
BRS studied possible advantages of private companies overtaking the U.S. Army’s 
logistics. It came to the conclusion that a future contractor would need to fulfill the 
requirement of being able to deploy 20.000 troops in five base camps within 180 
days in regions where the U.S. Army never had gone and therefore no pre-erected 
bases existed. 
 
Soon after this report was finished, BRS, for a wonder the same company that 
determined the need for private contractors, was awarded the first LOGCAP 
contract, worth some billion dollars and lasting five years. 
 
Under LOGCAP 1, BRS that was already experienced in outsourced military 
missions109 was in charge of support tasks for the U.S. army in many international 
operations. Examples include the following operations:  
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Support Hope in Zaire, Operation 
Vigilant Warrior in Southwest Asia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and 
Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia-Herzegovina110. More detailed information on 
these missions and BRS’ tasks are listed in the appendix. 
 
In 1997, DynCorp, another major U.S. MSF, obtained the second LOGCAP contract  
and was able to outbid BRS who was criticized for overrunning costs in LOGCAP 1 
by 32%. Although these costs partly occurred due to the army’s increasing demand 
in services in the Balkans’ operations BRS was not able to get the contract 
continued111. 
                                                
107 U.S. Army, LOGCAP (2004a), http://www.amc.army.mil/ 
108 Comp. U.S. Army, LOGCAP (2004b), http://www.amc.army.mil/ 
109 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.136 
110 Comp. Ehab, Cox, DeLorme, Lanclos (1999) 
111 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.146 
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In 2001, LOGCAP 3 was again awarded to BRS that already provided the U.S. Army 
under LOGCAP 1. This time though the contract had a duration of ten years and 
was worth almost US$ 10 billion.  
 
Under this LOGCAP contract BRS overstretched the negotiated costs and hence got 
controlled by the Defense Contract Audit Agency that found a number of 
deficiencies. BRS and also LOGCAP were heavily criticized and incurred public 
attention. The problematic case of this contract is more precisely described in 
chapter 5.5.1.2. 
 
 
5.5.1.1 Focus on DynCorp 
 
In 1975, the small country of East Timor, situated in the Pacific, was left by 
Portuguese colonialists and hence integrated by Indonesia as its 27th province in the 
following year. Since then the left-wing Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 
Timor (FRETILIN) has fought as an underground resistance movement for 
Indonesia’s retreat and the foundation of an independent nation. In 1998, Portugal 
and Indonesia agreed to “to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, 
negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East 
Timor…112". Additional negotiations between the two countries and the United 
Nations led to the decision of holding a referendum in East Timor that should direct 
the future of the country. In order to allow a fair popular consultation, the U.N. 
Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) was established. In August 1999 the overwhelming 
majority of almost 80% of the electors voted against the continuance within 
Indonesia and soon after pro-Indonesia rebels commenced to fight their opponents. 
As a result hundreds of people were killed, 250.000 had to flee and most of the little 
infrastructure that existed before was destroyed.  
 
In order to bring peace to the troubled region, the United Nations sanctioned an 
Australian led multinational coalition, called UN Sanctioned International Force In 
East Timor (INTERFET). This force, which was heavily supported by the U.S. Army, 
started its operation in late September 1999113. 
Due to East Timor’s almost impassable terrain and weak and furthermore mostly 
destroyed infrastructure helicopter transportation was urgently needed. In addition 
several roads were only navigable with four-wheel-drive vehicles and isolated 
regions could only be reached by air lift. 
 
The first support in helicopter lift was provided by the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit 
deployed on the U.S. Navy vessel USS Belleau Wood that was anchored off of East 
Timor’s coast. Other coalition partners, such as Canada, Sweden or the United 
Kingdom, did not deploy any helicopters suitable for the given conditions and the 
                                                
112 United Nations (1999a) 
113 Comp. European Union (2004), http://europa.eu.int/  
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Australian aircraft yielded was not ready for operations due to systemic transmission 
problems114. 
 
The initial tasks of the U.S. aircraft unit included the transportation of coalition forces 
and cargo loads as well as the provision of food, army equipment and agricultural 
equipage for the inhabitants. In addition the helicopters brought home people that 
had to flee because of the dangers of the FRETILIN.  
 
Beyond doubt, more Navy ships and troops were needed in order to properly fulfill 
the mission. The United States were not pleased to send another vessel as it would 
deploy U.S. resources for an indefinite time to this scene of conflict and make them 
less ready for other missions. Additionally, due to international political agreements 
U.S. Army helicopters were not given the allowance to operate from East Timorese’ 
soil.  
 
Therefore a different solution for helicopter support was needed and soon found in 
the second LOGCAP contract that was signed with DynCorp in 1997: The U.S. 
Pacific Command declared that INTERFET’s mission requirements would fully match 
with the LOGCAP contract115. 
 
DynCorp’s initial task was to assess the needed resources and its availability as well 
as to create a first estimate of cost. Together with U.S. Army officials DynCorp 
representatives came to the conclusion that four heavy-lift helicopters with ground 
support elements were needed. Furthermore they agreed on engineering support on 
the improvement of helicopter ports, the building of access ramps from the port to a 
runway and the erection of a temporary maintenance shelter. 
 
With the East Timor mission DynCorp ventured on a difficult task because due to the 
country’s poor domestic resources almost all laborers and equipment had to be flown 
in from other regions. Additionally, the close advent of the monsoon season posed 
the risk of decelerations of construction works that normally require dry surface. 
Another reason for the difficulty in this mission was the fast pace of deployment of 
DynCorp members that was demanded as U.S. officials wanted their soldiers shortly 
unsoldered in order to have them at home for the seasonal holidays116.  
 
Already in November 1999, the contractor’s first workers arrived and right away 
started to build a base camp and facilities that would permit the landing of the 
helicopters. Interestingly enough the first helicopters that were planned to arrive were 
Russian made models, civilian versions of Soviet transport helicopters used in the 
Cold War, although both the U.S. Army and the American contractor DynCorp would 
have been thought to use U.S. products. The reason for their choice was DynCorp’s 
subcontractor Clintondale that rejected an American make. Although DynCorp had 
other resources that could have supplied them with helicopters, Clintondale was the 
                                                
114 Comp. Mattox and Guinn (2000) 
115 Comp. Keller (2000) 
116 Comp. Folk and Smith (2000) 
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only one to provide such large ones within the short period of deployment that was 
set up by the U.S. Army. 
 
Identifying the right aircraft was not the only hard task that DynCorp had to 
accomplish. Before contracting out the provision of helicopters, company’s 
representatives had to inspect each of the four helicopters that were parked in 
Russia, Slovakia and Bulgaria and to control their mint condition. Furthermore 
DynCorp, together with U.S. officials, had to get into talks with the Russian embassy 
as the Russian government initially permitted the usage of their helicopters in East 
Timor and refused Russian crews to take on work at this conflict. After succeeding in 
this issue DynCorp and a subcontractor arranged the 11.000 mile journey from 
Europe to Asia in December 1999. In order to fulfill this task, various hindrances, 
such as diplomatic interventions that made it able for the aircrafts to pass 
international airspace corridors, had to be managed so that the helicopters could 
ultimately arrive at the theatre of operation. 
 
Besides the helicopters, also spare parts, a fueling truck and further equipment was 
flown in by a civilian transport plane and unload for its use at East Timor’s main 
airport. Another subcontractor imported earth-moving equipment on vessels that 
arrived from Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital, due to the non-existence of heavy devices 
in the troubled region. It is important to underscore that all means for reconstruction 
were transported by civilian companies as already mentioned political decisions did 
not allow U.S. forces to have their helicopters landed in East Timor. The catchy task 
in this mission was that without given resources everything needed for work had to 
be brought in from other regions. Furthermore a concrete plant had to be erected 
and water wells had to be sunk. Also sand and concrete that was immediately 
needed for the construction of the heliport as well as experienced workers which 
were not available in East Timor had to be imported. Already in January 2000 all 
heliports were finished and the four helicopters, that were back then the biggest 
available in the world, could continue their work using total capacities. At that time 
they still had to bring fled Timorese citizens back home to their communities and to 
perform medical evacuations117. 
 
Later on, another main task of the helicopters’ crews was to transport U.N. 
peacekeepers that had meanwhile arrived. Their mission was called United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), sanctioned by the Security 
Council on October 25th 1999, and its aim was to provide security and to oversee the 
foundation of an independent government118 which was made possible as Indonesia 
renounced its 27th province in October 1999119. DynCorp additionally had to establish 
a perfect communication system as mostly merely one crew member was able to 
speak fluently English. As no navigation aid existed in East Timor several instruction 
lessons were needed to brief the crews on flight areas120. 
                                                
117 Comp. Keller (2000) 
118 Comp. United Nations (1999b) 
119 Comp. European Union (2004), http://europa.eu.int/ 
120 Comp. Keller (2000) 
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When the INTERFET mission was subject to be totally surrogated by UNTAET, the 
U.S. Army came to the conclusion that the new mission would still be in need of 
DynCorp’s support. Therefore the United States prolonged the company’s work 
under the LOGCAP contract and put them into charge of more tasks as it has initially 
performed at the theatre of operation. The new jobs included medical and morale 
support to the troops as well as the provision of food, fuel, lodging and a 
communications system. In order to be able to fulfill these requirements DynCorp 
flew in new and additional personnel and started to hire local workers121. 
 
As a result of all international efforts, including those of DynCorp, East Timor 
became an independent country on May 20 2002 and joined the United Nations with 
the changed name of Timor-Leste as its 191st member state in the same year122. 
Since then the United Nations still has peacekeeping troops in the region under a 
new mission called The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
(UNMISET). Its operational tasks are stated in the following: 
 
“to consolidate the achievements of the transitional phase by 
providing core administrative structures critical for the 
maintenance of the viability and political stability of the new 
state, providing interim law enforcement and the development of 
a law enforcement agency, and the maintenance of external and 
internal security123”  
 
Due to the program’s prosperity the United Nations are planning to end the 
UNMISET mission in 2005 and prepare a smooth transition to a sustainable future 
development124.  
 
According to various parties, DynCorp representatives, U.S. Army officials as well as 
other nation armies’ members, the East Timor operation of DynCorp was a big 
success and underscores the advantages of having a civilian contractor supporting 
the troops: 
 
 
“The contracted use of helicopters in East Timor was a distinct 
and unique challenge. Many lessons were learned and 
challenges overcome. DynCorp and the … LOGCAP Program 
Manager's Office proved that they can provide any 
augmentation that a commander desires anywhere in the world. 
The East Timor mission raised the awareness among military 
personnel that contractors can and will be used to perform a 
variety of functions on the battlefield, overcoming restrictions 
that arise in today's complex international arena. By having 
nonmilitary alternatives like LOGCAP, both commanders and 
                                                
121 Comp. Folk and Smith (2000) 
122 Comp. Bothe (2003), p.22, quoted in: von Schorlemer (2003) 
123 United Nations (2005), http://www.unmiset.org  
124 Comp. United Nations (2004e), http://www.unmiset.org 
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diplomats have flexible options that previously were 
unavailable125.” 
(Captain Steven Keller, DynCorp Aerospace Technologies) 
 
 
“The LOGCAP contractors have performed superbly. Clearly, 
with current pressures on operating and personnel tempo, 
contingency contracting has gained favor as a means of 
supporting U.S. forces. USPACOM's use of contingency 
contracting demonstrates another way of providing U.S. support 
to coalition allies. It is a model for consideration when planning 
future contingency operations126.“  
(Brigadier General Philip Mattox, Director for Logistics, 
Engineering, and Security Assistance, U.S. Pacific Command 
and Lieutenant Colonel William Guinn, Deputy for the Logistics 
Resources Division) 
 
“The East Timor mission has been rated a total success. The 
efforts of the contractors have validated the fundamental 
LOGCAP concept that the United States can support its 
overseas commitments without always having to use military 
assets directly127.” 
(Captain MacIsaac, Canadian Forces College) 
 
 
Summing up, it has to be mentioned that DynCorp provided far more tasks in East 
Timor for the U.S. Army as it was initially planned. It can be said that DynCorp not 
only acted as an aircraft supplier but even more as a provider of a great number of 
logistical tasks. Furthermore it acted as a recruiter, construction firm, hospital and 
airport operator. The mission in East Timor shows that MSFs, such as DynCorp, are 
uttermost capable of supporting or substituting armies’ logistical units and 
furthermore amplify their capabilities in international operations.  
 
Finally, it is particularly important to mention that DynCorp was able to act within a 
very short period of time after it was informed to start the mission. The capability of 
rapid reaction makes this company and other civilian entities that work in the same 
branch superior to United Nations humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions as 
latest are mostly unable to immediately send troops to theatres of operations128.  
 
5.5.1.2 Focus on BRS 
 
The previous chapter concentrated on and pictured a successful operation of a MSF 
under LOGCAP. However, there are several critical voices that attest a negative 
side concerning this program caused by irregularities at the placing and during the 
performance of these contracts:  
                                                
125 Keller (2000) 
126 Mattox and Guinn (2000) 
127 MacIsaac (2001) 
128 Comp. Jett (2000), p.53 
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LOGCAP 1 was awarded to Brown and Root Services, a subsidiary of Halliburton, in 
1992 after then Secretary of Defense Cheney had contracted the same company to 
produce a classified report detailing how private firms, like BRS itself, could provide 
logistical tasks for the U.S. Army in combat. In 1995, Cheney left the government 
and became CEO of Halliburton until 2000, when he quitted due to the beginning of 
the presidential campaign. During his leadership the company obtained larger 
outsourcing contracts from the government than ever before as the following figure 
illustrates:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: U.S. Government contracts awarded to Halliburton and its subsidiaries 
1990 - 1999129
 
In 2001, Halliburton was awarded with the third LOGCAP contract being worth 
almost US$10 billion. The following table details this contract: 
 
 
LOGCAP 3 
Contracted Company: Brown and Root Services (BRS)* 
Award date: December 2001 
Type of contract: Indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quality cost-plus award fee 
Length of contract: 1 year plus 9 option years 
Contract ceiling price No dollar value; operational requirement used to establish ceiling 
Estimated value of work under 
contract: US$ 9.1 billion 
*also termed as Kellog, Brown and Root (KBR) 
 
Table 2: Details on the third LOGCAP contract130
                                                
129 Center for Public Integrity (2001), http://www.publici.org  
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The interweaving between Cheney’s political and private business’ careers, as 
shown in the following figure, has not torn off until today as he stills receives 
thousands of dollars each year from the company in deferred compensation131. 
However, the Vice President continues to argue that these payments do not have 
any influence on the Pentagon’s decisions of which company gets contracted132.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Dick Cheney’s career compared with the three LOGCAP contracts133
 
But not only the award of the third LOGCAP contract to Halliburton was questioned, 
also later its performance came under attack when a former Halliburton employee 
confirmed that the company constantly dissipates public money in Iraq by spending 
too much on supplies for reconstruction. Democratic representative Henry Waxman, 
member of the Government Reform Committee, even states that “overcharging and 
improper business practices are part of the corporate culture at Halliburton134". 
Furthermore Halliburton is being said that it also overcharged the U.S. government 
US$61 million for oil field services. Of course Halliburton negated all accusations 
and even started a television campaign denying any improper procedures and 
stressing correct charging135.  
The above given example of BRS, its harshly criticized business practices and 
above all political exertion of influence concerning its contracts represent the shady 
side of the private military industry136. Therefore cases as the mentioned one should 
                                                                                                                                        
130 Government Accountability Office (2004), p.8 
131 Comp. Fischermann (2003) 
132 Comp. Baker (2004) 
133 Modelled after Peterson (2002), www.publicintegrity.org and Government Reform 
Committee (2004), http://reform.house.gov 
134 Waxman (2004), quoted in: Baker (2004) 
135 Comp. Baker (2004) 
136 Comp. Fischermann (2003) 
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be taken for serious and be subject to discuss about in order to have this branch 
seen in a more favorable light.   
 
5.5.1.3 Other areas of outsourcing 
 
Besides the above mentioned examples of BRS and DynCorp also many other 
companies are awarded major outsourcing contracts in various fields of the U.S. 
Army needs. In the following further examples are shortly described: 
In February 2002 the U.S. Army awarded two civilian companies contracts totaling 
US$172.4 million to hire and manage recruiters for several areas throughout the 
United States. Both contracted companies, Military Professional Resources Inc. 
(MPRI) and Resource Consultants Inc. (RCI), are no new suppliers for the Army as 
they have performed recruiting for the Army reserve units since 1999137.  
“Former soldiers who were recruiters by military 
occupational specialty are the most sought after in the 
hiring process; next are veterans who spent three years 
as detailed recruiters, or recruited for any of the other 
military branches138”  
says Don Tarter, recruiting operations vice president for MPRI. Once hired future 
recruiters get a basic training in enlistment incentives and U.S. Army Recruiting 
Command policies and procedures. According to Cardell Hunter, recruiting 
operations vice president for RCI, his company is a competent partner and supplier 
for the Army:  
"We have demonstrated excellence in a number of 
Army programs. In 1990 the Army awarded us a $168 
million Army Career and Alumni Program contract. We 
also have provided transitional counselling to 1.1 million 
soldiers. We have recruited over 20,000 young men 
and women into the Army Reserve or National Guard. 
Our help desk, which provides counselling to soldiers 
who are leaving one state Guard unit to go to another, 
has reduced the attrition rate of Guard soldiers from 16 
percent to under 2 percent."139  
He nevertheless he argues that “the biggest challenge for the recruiters will be to 
convince the skeptics that civilians can successfully recruit for the Army140”. Not only 
recruiting soldiers, also integrating them back to their communities after their service 
is one aspect of RCI’s task explains Hunter: 
                                                
137 Comp. Triggs (2002) 
138 Tarter (2002), quoted in Triggs (2002) 
139 Hunter (2002), quoted in Triggs (2002) 
140 Hunter (2002), quoted in Triggs (2002) 
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"Our recruiters will be afforded the opportunity to make 
sales presentations at high schools, colleges and stay 
deeply involved in the community. They will know the 
educators, moms, dads, clergymen and other centres of 
influence in the community. When the town's sons and 
daughters go off to basic, our recruiters will still be there 
when they get back to help facilitate their transition 
back into the community. 141"  
Furthermore in 2003, the U.S. Army awarded a 10-year contract worth up to US$2 
billion to General Dynamics Corp. to provide IT products to the U.S. government. 
The supply comprises both, conventional IT products such as PCs, handheld 
devices, networking equipment, commercial software, application development tools 
and printers as well as products adapted to withstand severe weather conditions 
and to operate in difficult places, such as battlefields. The U.S. Army’s benefit in this 
deal is that it has one reliable point of contact for purchasing and customer service 
that is able to supply the latest technology. General Dynamics itself outsources parts 
of the contract to sub-suppliers, such as Sun Microsystems Inc., Cisco Systems Inc. 
and DRS Technologies Inc, yet General Dynamics remains as the primary 
contractor, merely providing the products and adapting them as needed by the U.S. 
Army142. 
 
5.5.2 Military Consultant Firm (MCF) 
 
Military Consultant Firms operate closer to the actual scene of war than previously 
described Military Support Firms do. MCFs mainly offer training and consultant 
services that are vital for the execution of any combat mission or the maintenance of 
security in crisis regions. Likewise non-military consultant companies in private 
business, also MCFs are often in charge of changes and reconstructions of 
organizations that are eager to meliorate their competencies or strength in a very 
short period of time to a large extent143. Furthermore these companies perform 
strategic and operational analyses yet they do not directly act at the scene of war. 
This fact is the difference between MCFs and Military Provider Firms that sometimes 
even operate in the frontline of a war144.  Singer describes consultant companies as 
enterprises within the military branch that do not have “customer contact145”, 
meaning that MCFs employees are not deployed on the battlefield.  
 
Another characteristic of such companies is that the client, and not the contracted 
company, always remains responsible for all risks in the end. However consultant 
companies still represent a very important factor for armies as “the application of 
knowledge and training are often just as valuable as the application of firepower146”. 
                                                
141 Hunter (2002b), quoted in Triggs (2002d) 
142 Perez (2003) 
143 Comp. Kümmel (2004), p.14 
144 Comp. Brown (2000), quoted in: Singer (2003a), p.95 
145 Singer (2003a), p.95 
146 Singer (2003a), p.95 
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The use of MCFs is widespread yet mostly they are hired when a reorganization of 
an organization’s or unit’s structure is impending. The advantage in having an 
outside company involved in such a process is that far more expertise and 
experience can be used when specialists from the private sector participate. Also 
different and often more economical prospects are taken into account if restructuring 
is shifted away from the military itself to outside military consultants.  
 
Discussing and defining MCFs cannot be done without mentioning Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). This company was found in 1987 by 
former U.S. generals and soon received contracts worth millions of dollars. As most 
companies in the private military branch also MPRI has a database of thousands of 
retired soldiers who are experts in various military tasks. It employs 930 people on a 
regular basis and can revert to 15.000 military skilled adepts147.  
 
These men and women are deployable anytime and build the basis and key asset of 
the company. Although MPRI merely started to work on U.S. soil, e.g. it ran Reserve 
Officers Trainings Corps (ROTC) at domestic universities, it later began to operate 
in international missions148.  
 
In the following, MPRI’s activities for the U.S. military, which represent good 
examples for MCFs operations in general, are listed: 
 
 
• Instruction at U.S. Army Schools 
• Tactical training and war gaming support 
• Organization assessment and development for several U.S. Army units 
• Simulations development and support 
• Mentoring, expert support, and senior leadership seminars for various U.S. 
Army units 
• Strategic planning and staff augmentation 
• Military doctrinal support 
• Logistical planning149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
147 Comp. Volkery (2002) 
148 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.119ff. and Wayne (2002) 
149 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.124 
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5.5.3 Military Provider Firm (MPF) 
 
MPFs are the kind of private military companies that operate closest to scenes of 
war as they even directly engage in fighting. Often specially trained and skilled 
employees, such as combat pilots, take over armies’ work and thereby their core 
competence of what is warfare. Furthermore provider firms are sometimes given the 
right of command and control over units by militaries that contracted them. In 
several cases MPFs are hired as substitutes for inefficient and weak national armies 
that are not anymore able to assure security in their assigned countries or regions.  
 
Examples of nations that used provider firms include Angola, Sierra Leone, Papua 
New Guinea and Indonesia, being all less developed countries that have been 
facing armed fighting on their soil for years. According to Singer, MPFs mostly offer 
two different contracts to mentioned clients: Either they supply them with armed 
units, ranging from small platoons to large-scale troops, that are in charge for the 
whole mission or they send experienced commanders and experts that support 
nation’s armies at the frontline. Additionally he adds that the typical client of an MPF 
is threatened by immediate high risk situation and not able to defend himself150.  
 
Although provider firms’ units are in most cases smaller in numbers than their 
client’s opponents, they are more effective as they are perfectly trained for crisis 
intervention, well experienced due to similar past operations and furthermore 
outfitted with state-of-the-art equipment. These advantages over exceed their 
adversaries outnumbering fighters and mostly lead to a success in their clients’ 
mission.  
 
Executive Outcomes is a paradigm for a MPF as its operations in Sierra Leone 
throughout the 1990ies shows: It then supplied the government of the African state 
with more than 500 troops, sufficient weapons, transport planes and ships, combat 
helicopters, combat planes and various other high-tech military equipment, in order 
to support them to repel rebel groups151. In this case Executive Outcomes rather 
replaced Sierra Leone’s defense unit than support it. Especially due to their active 
participation in fighting MPFs are often heavily criticized and have a bad reputation.  
An example for that situation is found in Sandline’s mission in Papua New Guinea. 
As later in the paper more detailed described the company circumvent possible 
accusations of mercenaries by having its employees given citizenships of its clients’ 
nation in order not to brake the laws of the Geneva Convention.  
 
5.5.4 Other typologies 
 
Not only military analyst Peter Singer but also some other experts in this area have 
established typologies that differ between the various kinds of Private Military 
Companies. David Shearer discerns PMCs by its activities.  
                                                
150 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.92ff.  
151 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.94 
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The following table presents the five different kinds he instances: 
 
Field of Work Companies 
Military Operational Support Examples 
 
Combat Missions: 
• Provision of support for government military 
missions 
• Participation in government military 
operations 
 
 
• Sandline,  
• Executive Outcomes 
Military Advice Examples 
 
Operation’s training and assistance 
• Provision of military training for state armies 
Procurement 
• Purchases and advice 
Military analysis 
• Assessment of military threats to states 
 
 
 
• MPRI 
• Vinnell 
• Executive Outcomes
• Sandline 
Logistical Support Examples 
 
Logistical tasks 
• Equipment delivery 
• Protection of U.N. peacekeppers 
Post-conflict resolution 
• Re-establishing public infrastructure 
• Mine clearance 
 
 
 
• BRS 
• DynCorp 
• DSL 
Security Services Examples 
 
Commercial security protection 
• Guarding property 
• Guarding Personnel 
 
 
• Group 4 
• Saladin 
Crime-Prevention Services Examples 
 
• Investigation and intelligence-gathering 
• Kidnap response 
 
 
• Kroll 
• Saladin 
 
Table 3: Shearer’s PMC Typology152
                                                
152 Modelled after Shearer (1998), p.25 
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German military expert Gerhard Kümmel’s differentiation is mainly modeled after 
Singer but brings up a forth type of PMC, namely the Security Provider Firm. This 
term refers to companies that do not necessarily engage in the frontline of a war but 
to those that rather protect private enterprises facilities and its personnel in failed 
states. However they do not shy away from the use of arms if their client is 
threatened by hostile assaults153. Weingartner however differs between Private 
Security Companies, which operate in low-risk areas, e.g. facility surveillance, 
Private Military Companies which support or substitute armies in combat, and 
mercenaries, that fight for any army on their own account with the mere motivation 
of financial profit154. 
 
5.6 Motives for PMCs nowadays 
 
The increased necessity of the private military industry can be linked to three major 
reasons155. First, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the Berlin Wall in 1989 made East and West moving closer and 
decreased the process of arming-up they had persecuted for the last decades. As a 
consequence the demand for weapons shrank, armies reduced its personnel and 
numerous former soldiers got unemployed building now a vast pool of possible 
employees for PMCs. Secondly, the transformation in the nature of warfare, e.g. the 
fact that military equipment and weapon systems are that sophisticated that only 
private contractors can handle them, led to a situation in which PMCs are not an 
option for a modern army, yet a must. Finally, the privatization and thereby the 
outsourcing trend of the 1980ies also strongly influenced defense units that 
expected large-scale savings and renewed force in their core-tasks by contracting 
out.  
 
5.6.1 Motive 1: End of Cold War 
 
According to Singer, armed disputes increasingly occurred after the end of the Cold 
War due to a “power vacuum that is typical of transition periods in world affairs156”. 
During the Cold War, the great powers United States and Russia always intervened 
in conflicts when they seemed to get out of control. Since the 1990s, the two 
nations’ interests in intermediating actions in conflict areas diminished and as a 
consequence zones of instability and combat either arose or swelled again. 
 
 
According to Kurlantzick “the end of the global superpower rivalry … made big 
powers less willing to prop up weak states, engage in foreign combat deployments 
                                                
153 Comp. Kümmel (2004), p.21 
154 Comp. Weingartner (2004) 
155 Comp. Singer (2003a), p. 49 
156 Singer (2003a), p.50 
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that have little ideological value, or become involved in civil wars abroad157”. Another 
example for such a transition period is the end of the Hundred Years’ War in 1453, 
where bulks of soldiers got unemployed. As a result they joined together, and 
founded the first security companies that traveled across nations searching for 
work158. 
 
5.6.1.1 Big powers intervention 
 
As already mentioned during the Cold War particularly the U.S. Army and other 
Great Powers’ defense troops intervened in many international conflicts. In 1987 
concerning this situation University of Yale professor and former U.N. workgroup 
leader Paul Kennedy even argued that “the United States’ global interests and 
obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them all 
simultaneously159”.  
 
The following map displays the strong commitment to international deployment of 
U.S. troops at the end of the cold war: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: U.S. deployment during the Reagan tenure160
 
 
In the late 1990s the United States and the Soviet Union still were the reason for a 
bipolar world in which according to Kennedy only these two nations “have the 
capacity to ensure each other’s destruction – and the destruction of any other 
                                                
157 Kurlantzick (2003a) 
158 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.24 
159 Kennedy (1987), p.515 
160 Modelled after PBS (2005), http://www.pbs.org 
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country161”. With the end of the Cold War, Western countries stopped to take part in 
most international conflicts and turned their attention more and more to new areas of 
interest, such as recently founded states of the former Soviet Union and directed 
most of their resources towards these new nations, such as the Ukraine or 
Chechnya, moving away from places which had had top priority for them for 
decades. Both U.S. and Soviet political representatives realized that intense conflict 
intervention was not their primary strategic goal anymore162. In his last address to 
the General Assembly U.S. President Ronald Reagan elucidated that crisis 
participation would be shifted on to the international community: 
 
 
“Precisely because of these changes, today the United Nations 
has the opportunity to live and breathe and work as never 
before….We are determined that the United Nations should 
succeed and serve the cause of peace for human kind163.” 
 
 
In 1987, also Michael Gorbachev, then leader of the CPSU, the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, made clear that the time of Soviet military intervention was over 
for the major part. By that action the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize laureate took a big 
step toward future international conflict resolutions. Particularly he brought forward 
this motion as the Soviet people were not pleased by the military intervention in 
Afghanistan that specially harmed the domestic economy164. 
 
As a result of this sharp policy change, nations were suddenly left alone with their 
problems and needs. Though governments attempted to establish or maintain 
democratic systems on their own they failed and consequently domestic revolts and 
coups followed. As many nations had insufficient armed forces conflicts could not 
been hamstrung and so they spread out and mostly have not found to an end until 
today. 
 
In the case of African states the omitting of Western support led to an environment 
in which terror organizations as well as guerrilla units found a perfect field for their 
activities. The policy change led to uneven relations of intervention in crises. For 
example since 1998 30.000 NATO peacekeepers have been deployed in Kosovo 
but only 10.000 U.N. troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country that is 
almost 100 times bigger than the troubled Balkan province and had to face more 
than 3 million deaths due to severe fighting165. This example shows that the ratio of 
peacekeeping resources and capabilities drastically changed for the benefit of 
conflicts bearing more promising peace prospects. 
 
                                                
161 Kennedy (1987), p.538 
162 Comp. Shearer (1998), p.10 
163 Reagan (1988), quoted in: Rikhye (1990), p.171 
164 Comp. Rikhye (1990), p.171 
165 Comp. Fréchette (2004) 
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In addition corrupt governments did not ease the strained situation but on the 
contrary exploited their citizens and the countries’ future. Though inner African 
attempts of stabilizing the continent’s situation were performed, they mostly fell 
down due to a lack in financial resources and problems of acceptance and finally 
resulted in the quintupled number of civil wars ever since 1960 reaching a climax of 
50 incidents in 1995166.  
 
A further problematic issue in Africa was that many violent crises did not stay within 
one country’s border but escalated to cross-border territories as the 1997 D.R. of 
Congo conflict showed. Not only D.R. of Congo, but also neighboring Uganda and 
Rwanda went then into conflict. As the example of D.R. of Congo portrays, many 
governments failed in providing security for its citizens and thus PMCs were a 
welcome solution. The unbalanced security situation was furthermore a 
consequence of missing external control of countries’ foreign policy by great world 
powers, such as the United States, and international institutions. 
 
As a consequence, external, non-African support was and still is essential for the 
coverage of the numerous conflicts in this troubled region where besides the violent 
actions also epidemics and famines put a major threat to the people167. 
 
Although the United States and the former Soviet Union were the two biggest 
powers who retreated from their worldwide conflict intervention policy after the Cold 
War, also other nations started to change their foreign military policy: 
 
France constitutes another example of a Western state that withdrew it’s 
participation in international conflicts. Since the Balladur government, between 1995 
and 1997, France pursues a military pullback from its former colonies, such as Mali, 
Cote d’Ivoire or Gabon. The following Prime Minister Jospin, elected in 1997, went 
on with the retreat of French troops from Africa and also planned to decrease the 
number of French troops in Africa to 5.500 in 2002. Having intervened in African 
conflicts almost 40 times since the 1960s, France did not send additional troops to 
the Cote d’Ivoire in 1999 when an African Army General organized a coup and came 
into power. At that time merely 6.500 French soldiers remained in the African state, 
a tenth of the troops that were sent there in 1960168. 
 
Besides big powers’ new fields of interest also another reason contributed to an 
increase in PMCS. It was the public’s non-acceptance of casualties occurring in 
conflicts that do not necessarily pose a risk for a nation itself169. For instance the 
United States’ war in Afghanistan in October 2001 was strongly backed by American 
citizens as the Asian’s country terror group Al-Qaeda was respected as a threat to 
U.S. territory and people. Concerning conflicts in Africa or in the Balkan States this 
public support was never as high as in the cases of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq 
                                                
166 Comp. Duffield (1999) 
167 Comp. Pabst (2004), p.19 
168 Comp. Mehler (2004), p.6 
169 Comp. Shearer (1998), p.10 
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due to the fact that these disputes never put any real danger towards the United 
States. A document published by the Commission on America’s national interests, 
“a group of Americans who are convinced that, in the absence of American global 
leadership, citizens will find their fortunes, their values, and indeed their lives 
threatened as surely as they have ever been170”, underlines the already mentioned 
lower interest of the United States in conflict intervention when the theatre of war 
does not pose danger to the country as it does not list a single conflict on the African 
continent found to be necessary enough for a U.S. intervention. Nevertheless, in 
2002, eleven wars and various other armed conflicts still were set in Africa being 
then the continent with the most violent crises. It should be mentioned that one of 
this Commission’s members was Condoleezza Rice, back then professor of political 
science at Stanford University, who became National Security Advisor in 2001 and 
was 2004, after President George W. Bush’s re-election, nominated Secretary of 
State replacing former U.S. General Colin Powell. Being now an impetus in the U.S. 
Government, her interests will have a great influence on America’s foreign policy. 
 
5.6.1.2 International intervention 
 
As it was obvious that without Great Powers’ stake worldwide conflicts would 
proliferate the United Nations tried to fill the gap of intervention and stabilization the 
super powers had performed at various conflicts the previous decades. In 1992, the 
former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published An Agenda for 
Peace, a paper that directed at the avoidance of conflicts by using preventive 
diplomacy and humanitarian aid, that implemented the International community’s 
ambition in world peace. 
 
In its eleventh article the agenda on one hand describes the phenomenon of 
globalization and its positive outcomes, e.g. closer cooperation between nations, 
and on the other hand it lists the troubled situation of new nationalistic statements 
that result in violent conflicts: 
 
 
“We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely 
contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of 
States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some 
of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic 
rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced 
communications and global commerce, and by the decisions of 
States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common 
political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new 
assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the 
cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, 
social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on 
the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion 
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and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine 
evolution and change through democratic means171.” 
 
 
The following graph shows the ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. 
Apparently half of them take place on the African continent where conflict is 
widespread: 
 
 
 
Figure 11: United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in 2004172
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
171 Boutros-Ghali (1992), in: http://www.un.org 
172 United Nations (2004a), http://www.un.org 
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Further more the decrease in the number of U.N. troops since the end of the Cold 
War is very interesting: 
 
 
United Nation Peacekeeping Missions 
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Figure 12: Troops deployed in U.N. Peacekeeping Missions 1995-2004173
 
 
The graph shows that the number of troops sharply decreased until 1999, when 
disputes in Africa urged several additional U.N. missions. Due to some operations’ 
failure, as in the case of Uganda and Rwanda, where the U.N. Peacekeeping 
Mission UNAMIR tried to set up a ceasefire in the 1990ies but failed and came 
under attack or the1993 U.N. peacekeeping mission to Somalia (UNOSOM 1 & and 
UNOSOM 2) where 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in the nation’s capital Mogadishu174, 
troops got smaller as tasks got too dangerous175. 
 
There are several reasons for the malfunction of the international force in the above 
mentioned conflict. First, it is important to know that the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Forces that won the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize, is unlike most other 
military units clearly not designed for war-fighting. Its officers and soldiers tasks 
include the monitoring and observation of “peace processes situations and assist 
ex-combatants to implement the peace agreements they have signed176”. 
 
Furthermore, U.N. peacekeepers should operate unarmed or lightly armed and only 
use force when they have to defend themselves. 27 fatalities in the UNAMIR 
mission in Uganda and Rwanda testify the danger in those recent conflicts.  
                                                
173 United Nations (2004b), http://www.un.org 
174 Comp. Jett (2000), p.3 
175 Comp. United Nations (2004c), http://www.un.org 
176 United Nations (2004d), http://www.un.org 
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U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan alludes to this troubled situation as he argues 
that peacekeeping missions are not a solution to every international conflict:  
 
 
“We must know the limits of what is achievable by the United 
Nations. We should be especially careful not to allow ourselves 
to be used as a fig leaf for lack of political will by the 
international community to deal effectively with an issue. If the 
Security Council seeks to give the Secretary-General a mandate 
which he believes to be unachievable, especially if coupled with 
means which he knows to be inadequate, he should say so, 
clearly and in advance. I believe that we have learnt that lesson, 
uncomfortable though it may be177.” 
 
 
The high risk in these operations results in several U.N. member states’ displeasure 
of sending its troops to U.N. missions. Therefore, it often takes quite a time until a 
peacekeeping unit is ready to intervene in conflicts. In the case of Rwanda in 1993, 
not before five months after UNAMIR was implemented by the Security Council, the 
2.548 peacekeepers were gathered178. The United Nation itself knows that they 
cannot help in some missions as Australian General John Sanderson, former chief 
of UNTAC, United Nation’s mission to Cambodia between 1992 and 1993, said: 
“You either go to war or you go home179”. 
 
His statement emphasizes the inability of peacekeeping troops in some conflicts and 
leads to the conclusion that without Western states’ support peace will not be 
reached in reachable future180. 
 
Another reason for U.N. peacekeeping missions’ failures is found in the composition 
of its troops which mostly origin from developing countries. Out of 103 nations that 
send soldiers to the U.N., merely six of them represent almost 50 % of the whole 
troop of 62.790 peacekeepers. These six nations are all but first world countries, 
namely Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Ghana, India and Nigeria and classified as 
low-income countries by the Worldbank181. As every contributing nation has to rely 
on its own domestic material182 it is made clear that a lack in training and equipment 
for international operations occurs due to limited budgets of developing nations’ 
armies183. Therefore, a great need in support by industrialized nations’ armies exists, 
as they have the resources for international military missions.  
 
                                                
177 Annan (2004), in: http://www.un.org 
178 Comp. United Nations (2004c), http://www.un.org 
179 Sanderson, quoted in: Bandow (2000)  
180 Comp. Bandow (2000) 
181 Comp. Worldbank (2004), http://www.worldbank.org 
182 Comp.  Rikhye (1990), p.181 
183 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.59 
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Besides the shift in contributions to U.N. missions the general commitment to those 
more and more dangerous activities is a troubled issue.  
 
Therefore, the United Nations are dependent on less developed countries that 
contribute most to the international forces. U.N.’s Deputy Secretary-General Louise 
Fréchette strengthens this situation and also criticizes the OECD states: 
  
“I would be sorely remiss if I did not here acknowledge the role 
of India -- which, along with Pakistan and Bangladesh, now 
provides the bulk of non-African peacekeepers deployed in 
Africa, and is thus one of the few hold-outs against a trend 
towards the regionalization of peacekeeping.  The nations of this 
region have played critical roles in many difficult and dangerous 
UN missions -- and their ongoing commitment to peacekeeping 
is something the Secretary-General deeply values, and that our 
Organization sorely needs184.” 
 
In 2000, the United Nations reacted on its past failures and implemeted the Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations that studied the circumstances and outcomes of 
recent missions and published its findings in a document that is known as the 
Brahimi Report, due to the panels’ chairman Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Algeria. This report submits several changes in the actual 
peacekeeping policy in order to be able to successfully accomplish future 
operations.  
 
It also traces the failures of recent U.N. missions to the weaker commitment of its 
member states and a lack in their financial support. Outstanding membership dues 
result in delays and malfunctions in the planning, administration and logistics of 
peacekeeping missions and this situation directly affects the positive outcome, 
namely the establishment of peace, in troubled areas185.  
 
The number of staff at the U.N. headquarters assigned to support peacekeeping 
operations perfectly reflects the alarming financial situation of the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.  
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The following table compares recent missions and its number of active troops in the 
field to the officers working at the headquarters. It shows that merely 26 employees 
have to coordinate operations while more than 35.000 peacekeepers are on duty: 
 
 
Name of Mission UNMIK UNAMSIL UNTAET MONUC 
Place of Action (Kosovo) (Sierra Leone) (East Timor) (D.R. Congo) 
Budget (estimated) 
2000/2001 
US$410 
million 
US$465 
million 
US$540 
million 
US$535 
million 
Peacekeepers 5718 13 000  11775 6037 
Professional Staff at Headquarters assigned full-time to support the operation 
Political Officer 1 1 1 1 
Military 0 2 2 3 
Civilian Police 2 0 1 1 
Logistics 
Coordinator 1 1 1 1 
Civilian Recruitment 
Specialist 1 0 1 1 
Finance Spezialist 1 1 1 1 
Total Headquarters 
Support Staff 6 5 7 8 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Personnel assigned to U.N. Peacekeeping Missions186
 
 
A shortage in financial funds also leads to late reimbursements payments to 
contributing nations for their troops and equipment. Whereas industrialized 
countries, such as the United States, Canada or Japan, can wait for the money 
without getting immediately into bankruptcy, smaller, less developed and financial 
troubled states like Ghana that contributed more than 2.300 peacekeepers in 2004, 
cannot agree to late payments due to their weak economies187.  
In 1998, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan got to the heart of the problem of 
outstanding dues when he held a speech at Rice University: "By withholding the 
payments the U.S. is provoking friends and foe alike…U.S. behavior is destroying 
trust among nations and this is a very serious charge188." The United Nations’ 
highest representative said that the United States would owe the United Nations the 
sum of US$1.5 Billion and that this would result into their inability to pay Fiji and 
Bangladesh for their troop contributions to peacekeeping operations in the Western 
Sahara. Furthermore, Annan added that late payments would affect nations’ interest 
in deploying soldiers for future missions and again criticized the U.N. biggest 
                                                
186 Modelled after Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000)
187 Comp. Rikhye (1990), p.181 
188 Annan (1998a), quoted in: CNN (1998), http://www.cnn.com 
 53
financial supporter as he stated that “the United States should not forget that 
peacekeeping and diplomacy were preferable to conflict189”. 
Nevertheless, it has to be said that the United States are the United Nations’ biggest 
financial contributor. The following table displays 2004’s biggest financial 
supporters: 
 
  
2004  Total 
Assessment 
Percentage of 
2004 Total 
Assessment Rank 
United States 363 24,47% 1 
Japan 280 18,88% 2 
Germany 124 8,36% 3 
United 
Kingdom 88 5,93% 4 
France 87 5,86% 5 
 
Table 5: Contributions to regular U.N. budget 2004190
 
Furthermore, Brahimi argues that peacekeepers were sent to conflicts where they 
should not have gone as they were unable to perform their task, namely peace-
building, as a result of inefficient resources, management and lack of mandate. 
According to Brahimi, mission leaders should be given more flexibility and 
autonomy191 by the United Nations in order to beard violent opponents192. Also, the 
deployed units should be given more customizable allowance for counter-attack 
measures that have to be put through if U.N. soldiers come under life-threatening 
fire193. The report further postulates a drastic change in the arming and in weapon’s 
usage as it states the following: 
 
 
“It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority 
to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more 
costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to 
the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes 
traditional peacekeeping194.”  
 
 
 
This change would alter the United Nations from an international body that 
diplomatically attempts to bring peace to an unit that would fight for freedom. 
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 54
 
Brahimi was not the first who recognized urgently needed melioration in 
peacekeeping. Already at the time of the end of the Cold War, Indar Rikhye, retired 
Major-General of the Indian Army and former Military Adviser to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, detected nuisances in U.N. peacekeeping missions. In his point 
of view, Security Council resolutions, that allow peacekeepers to intervene in 
conflicts, are often constructed in a way so that they can be interpreted differently 
concerning what leads to mission commanders’ problems in transforming 
resolutions into procedures at conflict scenes. Like Brahimi, also Rikhye says that 
exact and reformed guidelines for peacekeeping operations have to be set up if the 
security of U.N. soldiers and people shall be guaranteed. He is furthermore 
convinced that future conflicts will raise the number of needed peacekeepers that 
have to be contributed by the U.N. member states as well as he argues that intense 
training for troops sent by first-time contributors is necessary195. All proposed 
renewals and improvements of the U.N. Peacekeeping are well-meant and would 
certainly contribute to higher success rate of international operations but without 
essential and sufficient mustering of money this goal will not be reached on any 
account.  
 
Apart from the United Nations also the NATO including its newest members 
Bulgaria,, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia that all joined 
the international coalition in 2004, intensified its commitment to international crisis 
since the end of the Cold War 
 
“The greatest and most visible change in NATO’s activities since 
the end of the Cold War is its involvement in ending conflict, 
restoring peace and building stability in crisis regions196.”  
 
 
This statement dates from the NATO briefing on Building Peace and Stability in 
Crisis Regions in 2003. It shows that besides the United Nations also another 
international institution intervenes in international conflicts in order to stop fighting. 
According to the Secretary General Lord Robertson, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization is going to play a major role in crisis-management in the Euro-Atlantic 
area as it is the most effective military organization and has already intensively tried 
to help the U.N. to bring peace in conflict areas. Examples are the activities in 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, where the NATO supported in enforcing economic 
sanctions, an arms embargo and a no-flight zone197. Furthermore, it also helped the 
United Nations with military conceptions.  
Of course U.N. – and NATO activities have to be discerned especially when it 
comes to the intensive use of arms. In 1995, NATO forces led an air attack versus 
Bosnian Serb forces that was permitted by the United Nations due to Security 
Council Resolution 836. This document states that  
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“…Member States, acting nationally or through regional 
organizations or arrangements, may take, under authority of the 
Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, 
through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support 
UNPROFOR…198” 
 
According to former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, the target of this attack 
was to bring security into the Sarajevo Safe Area and to stop offences in this 
zone199. In 1999, another air-campaign, Operation Allied Force, was performed over 
a period of almost 3 months. NATO forces conducted nearly 40.000 sorties against 
targets in the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Serbia and the Republic of 
Montenegro. Though the NATO argued that it used precision-guided weapon 
systems in order to avoid civilian fatalities200 around 500 causalities occurred 
according to Human Rights Watch, the largest human right organization based in 
the United States201. Amnesty International yet claims that according to Yugoslavian 
media thousands of civilians were killed202. All institutions though state that no allied 
soldier was killed203. 
 
Of course not everyone was in favor of these attacks. The former Foreign Minister of 
the Czech Republic, Jiri Dienstbier, who was also the United Nations' special 
human-rights envoy to the Balkans from 1998 to 2001, criticized the bombings in 
Yugoslavia and even said that NATO’s operation was a “total failure204” as it did not 
bring peace and “conditions for democratic institutions. It is exactly what didn’t 
happen. … Even worse, there is no clear goal to this operation205”. The 
acknowledgement and experience of their operations in Europe led the NATO to 
peace supporting operations in Afghanistan, where the ISAF, the International 
Security Assistance Force helps to bring security into the nation’s capital Kabul, and 
Iraq where it supports its member Poland with logistics knowledge among other 
things206.  
 
As portrayed in the last pages, neither the great Western powers, nor the United 
Nations or any other international institution are eager to, or have the necessary 
resources to successfully intervene in all conflicts that cannot be solved by a country 
and its diplomatic and military means itself. As a consequence a different source is 
needed and found in Private Military Companies that are ready to accede this 
encroaching function: They fill the security gap and bring extra-domestic support 
that is still needed after all other parties have pulled back from conflicts. 
                                                
198 United Nations (1993) 
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5.6.2 Motive 2: Changes in the nature of warfare 
 
The end of the Cold War had the strongest impact on the partial transformation of 
military operations from state to non-state providers. Nevertheless also another 
factor, the change in the nature of warfare, influenced this shift. The use of highly 
developed technology led to the present situation in which not only wealthy states 
that are able to muster amounts of fighters, arms, and financial resources have the 
capability to go to war, as it was the case decades ago, but also small terns are 
likely to enter or commence conflicts. This is possible as, nowadays high-end 
military technology, e.g. complex software or biotechnology, is as important for 
successful warfare as ordinary weapons, e.g. tanks or guns are. These new 
resources are not anymore merely provided by state institutions, yet more and more 
developed by private entities that are most often not tied to sell their products to 
legal armies of nations but also to private buyers. Furthermore, the private sector is 
not only producing the same goods as armies, mostly it is ahead of them in the 
development and production of processed technology. These new high-tech weapon 
systems are also getting more and more expensive. As Kennedy even hyperbolically 
argues that in 2020 the cost of merely one aircraft could reach the Pentagon’s whole 
budget, it is clear that the private’s sector superior possibility of sourcing financial 
funds is a major advantage compared to already strain federal budgets.207.  
 
Therefore, the only limiting factor for non-state actors to operate in the security 
sector is the financing208. If sufficient monetary resources are given, civil groups or 
institutions have the possibility to invest in elaborated state-of-the-art machinery and 
equipment that sometimes even big armies do not possess.  General Mike Hayden, 
director of the NSA, the United States National Security Agency, once argued that 
the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, took place without any prior 
hunch as the terrorists’ equipment was better than those of the U.S. authorities209. 
Furthermore, he added that the United States Defense is “behind the curve in 
keeping up with the global telecommunications210”. According to Chris Westwood of 
the Royal Australian Air Force the NSA, the United States National Security Agency, 
once hired several hackers who then tried to gain access to highly sensitive and 
important computer systems. They were more than successful as they were able to 
perturb military communication and control navy vessels at sea211. Already more 
than 20 years ago, in 1983, the movie War Games picked up that topic. In this film a 
computer whiz-kid unintentionally gets access to a military central computer and 
thereby nearly initiates World War III. 
 
All these examples point out that highly skilled civilians are as able to perform 
inherently military high-tech tasks as army employees. Steven Metz, a former 
research professor on National Security Affairs, even argues that a war could be 
                                                
207 Comp. Kennedy (1987), p.443 
208 Comp. Singer (2003a), p.61 
209 Comp. Hayden (2001), quoted in: CNN (2001), http://www.cnn.com 
210 Hayden (2001), quoted in: CNN (2001), http://www.cnn.com 
211 Comp. Westwood (1996), in Singer (2003), p.63 
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commenced merely with some computers and internet connections. Therefore any 
non-state organization could be as successful as states and able to compete with 
national forces212. The only difference between the two is that civilians are not 
engaged to work for armies only but they are rather motivated to work for the private 
sector. Furthermore military units cannot be imagined without civilians anymore as 
high-tech weapons used in conflict are so complex that without civilian expertise 
they cannot be maintained or even operated213. For instance the U.S. Army is 
depended on contractors that care for and handle highly developed weaponry214 
furnished with most recent technology that originates from private contractors and 
not army resources. Colonel Steven Zamparelli of the U.S. Army Air War College 
even argues that once in an upcoming war a civilian will be the only one skilled to 
operate a sophisticated weapon system215. 
 
Latest examples of civilian support to army weapons are found in the third Iraq War 
where private companies maintain the F-117 stealth fighter and M1A1 Abrahams 
tank as well as operate unmanned drones216. In order to be able to use its 
sophisticated technological equipment big armies have to rely on civilian experts217. 
According to Kurlantzick “the war in Iraq could not have taken place without a 
network of for profit contractors upon which the U.S. military has come to 
depend218”. 
 
 
Loren Thompson, Chief Operating Officer of and defense analyst with the Lexington 
Institute goes even further when he states the following concerning the U.S. Army: 
 
 
“We’re using the most advanced technology in the history of the 
world to wage wars and sometimes the people who built it are 
the only ones who know how to fix it219.” 
 
 
According to LMI, a government consulting firm that conducted a report on civilian 
support in the first Iraq War in 1991, high-tech weapons need civilian operators: 
 
”There is a role for contractors on the battlefield, particularly 
when the tasks are so complex that it is not economically 
beneficial for the Army to maintain needed capability within the 
force220”. 
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Furthermore the Department of Defense’ old directive that at the latest 12 months 
after their implementation new weapon systems should be maintained by army 
employees and not by contractors disappeared and a new instruction that requires 
“maintenance and repair for all new critical weapons systems… for at least four 
years and for life for non-critical systems221” came into force in 1998222. 
 
 
5.6.3 Motive 3: Privatization trend  
 
The third major reason for the ascent of PMCs is the trend of privatization and 
outsourcing that had its advent in the private industry as well as in public firms 
particularly at the end of the 1970s when Margaret Thatcher, who was the first 
British Prime Minister and in office from 1979 to 1990, started to privatize and 
contract out public companies. The reasons for this process were found in 
disappointing performances of nationalized industries since the Second World War, 
often referred to as a situation of so called government failure or public failure223. 
This development was the converse of the process of nationalizing industries as it 
had occurred decades before, especially soon after 1945. The reason then was that 
the private market failed and therefore nations had to intervene in order to 
guarantee a solid economy. Nevertheless nationalized industries often failed 
because controlling and monitoring bodies did not properly execute their tasks and 
also management policies miscarried as they were based on the assumption of 
exact certainty of how the economy would develop224. As the process Thatcher 
started gained great success and helped to revitalize weak companies and thereby 
nation’s economies it was soon adopted by several other governments. De-
nationalizing industries was not anymore tied to a region but spread all over the 
globe and included formerly public functions such as garbage collection or the 
management of prisons225. 
Especially in the states of the former Eastern bloc, e.g. Rumania, where Gorbachev 
and his Perestroika lead to a change in the political as well as in the economic 
system many national firms got privatized. Duffield’s statement, “the idea of 
democracy is now even closely linked to that of privatization”226, underscores that 
privatization in post communist nations was a big step towards market economy.  
 
The following graph shows the persistent trend in privatizing national industries in 
OECD member countries from 1990 to almost the end of the millennium.  
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Figure 13: Amounts gained through privatization of state-owned industries in OECD 
countries 1990 to 2001227
 
 
In 1998 the sale of state-owned industries reached a peak with USD 100 billion 
compared to USD 20 billion in 1990. The reason for this rapid increase is found in 
state’s push-off of their largest industries, such as telecommunication companies or 
national airlines throughout the last decade of the century.  
Nevertheless since 2000 the amount has dropped as a result of the downward slide 
of the international economy that led to stops and postponements of large 
privatizations. 
Another reason for fewer and smaller transactions in the past four years can be 
found in the diminishing inventory of state’s assets. The biggest quantum was 
already alienated by governments in the 1980ies and 1990ies and therefore there is 
not so much left that might be privatized. 
 
At a time where the idea arose that the private market could act superiorly and more 
efficient than public institutions many governments even started to outsource 
functions that have never been thought of getting performed by non-state 
institutions. Examples include the collection of taxes or military support, all functions 
that are inherently connected with public performance228. However some countries, 
particularly developing ones, such as Liberia or Sierra Leone, transferred great parts 
of public jobs to third-party providers. 
International defense analyst Peter Singer even states that in some nations 
bureaucracy has vanished and private entities now act instead of the state in nearly 
all areas that were formerly performed by the public229. 
                                                
227 OECD (2005), http://www.oecd.org 
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Further it is important to know that several defense manufacturing companies 
occurred amongst the first national industries that got privatized. A slump in military 
spending forced governments to get rid of parts of their defense industry as it 
engulfed massive financial funds for research and development of new weapon 
systems that nations could not ante up anymore. In order to still be able to revert on 
its products nations simply sold defense manufacturing companies to the private 
market that then went on with this crucial business230.  
Although first mostly non-combat parts of armies, such as health-care or 
accommodation, were outsourced soon also the development, production, 
maintenance and even operating of high-tech weapon systems which are nowadays 
extremely vitally for successful warfare, got shifted to private providers231. U.S. Army 
General Barry McCaffrey confirms the outsourcing trend in the defense industry as 
he states the following: “I am unabashedly an admirer of outsourcing…There’s very 
few things in life you can’t outsource.232” 
Also the recent war in Iraq shows that nowadays contracting-out reaches all parts of 
the army. Non-combat tasks, such as the maintenance of housing facilities or the 
supply of food, as well as combat-functions, e.g. the operating of high-teach weapon 
systems or unmanned drones, are performed by private companies233. 
 
Finally privatization is often linked to the catchword globalisation that is defined as 
the increasing interaction of various economic systems through the growth in 
international trade and the bulge in trans-national social, cultural and technological 
exchange234. As this persistent process alleviates international trade not merely local 
providers are awarded outsourcing contracts but more often multinational 
companies take over former nationalized industries. 
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6 A-76 – the United States’ procedure for outsourcing in the armed forces 
 
6.1 Introduction to A-76 
 
Since the 1950s the U.S. Government repeatedly issued documents and circulars 
stating that it should obtain commercially available goods and services from the 
private sector when it makes economic sense to do so235. Circular A-76, first 
unveiled in 1966, establishes the policies and the process that governmental 
agencies must use in identifying commercial activities and whether these activities 
are best provided by the private sector or by the public sector. In this process, which 
is given the term competitive sourcing by the Department of Defense, a cost 
comparison, with the goal of less future expenditures236, between the bidders of a 
tender is executed237. Though this document was aimed at all governmental 
agencies, it had its strongest impact on the Department of Defense238. Of course an 
A-76 competition has to be managed and controlled by a federal institution namely 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that cares for a fair contest, 
regardless of who wins the cost competition239. 
As the two terms competitive sourcing and outsourcing resemble a clear distinction 
has to be made. They do not signify the same, yet closely intercommunicate. 
Competitive sourcing is the process of comparing costs between public and private 
performance. In the case, in which a private entity wins a public-private tender and 
thereby becomes the future provider or supplier of a commercial activity that was 
formerly performed by a governmental agency itself, is called outsourcing. It is 
important to know that when a function is outsourced the ownership, control and 
responsibility stay within the government’s agency240. 
 
6.2 History of A-76 
 
In 1955 under the Eisenhower tenure (1953-1961) the Bureau of the Budget 
published Bulletin No. 55-4 which says that the government should rely on the 
private sector. A further Bulletin disclosed in 1957 added cost comparison 
concepts241. Circular A-76 itself was published for the first time on March 3rd 1966 by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and explained 
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“the guidelines and procedures to be applied by executive 
agencies in determining whether commercial and industrial 
products and services used by the Government are to be 
provided by private suppliers or by the Government itself242.” 
 
 
In the following years the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), a 
subdivision of the OMB, that was then in charge of the Government's contracting-out 
policy, disclosed several reviews of Circular A-76, after it had received responses to 
and comments on its policy by federal institutions, such as the Congress or the 
General Accounting Office, as well as from the public. The biggest updates of 
Circular A-76 were issued in 1979 and 1983243, all retaining the government’s policy 
of relying on the private business if it can produce services more economically than 
a public source244. All revised circulars state that equilibrium between the interest of 
both, private and public organizations, should be reached245. 
 
In 1996, the OMB published the Revised Supplemental Handbook on Circular A-76, 
which clearly cited that the Circular was  
 
 
“not designed to simply contract out. Rather, it is designed to:  
(1) balance the interests of the parties to a make or buy cost 
comparison, 
(2) provide a level playing field between public and private 
offerors to a competition, and 
(3) encourage competition and choice in the management and 
performance of commercial activities. It is designed to empower 
Federal managers to make sound and justifiable business 
decisions246.” 
 
 
 
The abstract of the handbook on Circular A-76 shows that the government’s main 
goal is not to contract out every single activity that can also be performed by the 
private sector, it rather targets on cost savings and improved efficiency, which can be 
achieved by detecting the cheapest and most efficient provider, be it the public or the 
private sector. A further major revision of Circular A-76 was performed in 1999 and 
establishes federal policy regarding the performance of commercial activities and 
implements the statutory requirements of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act 
(FAIRact) of 1998 which’s details are explained later in this paper247.  
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The following abstract of the 1999 Revised Circular A-76 accounts the government’s 
policy on the performance of commercial activities: 
 
 
“Achieve Economy and Enhance Productivity. Competition 
enhances quality, economy, and productivity. Whenever 
commercial sector performance of a Government operated 
commercial activity is permissible, in accordance with this 
Circular and its Supplement, comparison of the cost of 
contracting and the cost of in-house performance shall be 
performed to determine who will do the work. When conducting 
cost comparisons, agencies must ensure that all costs are 
considered and that these costs are realistic and fair.  
 
Retain Governmental Functions In-House. Certain functions are 
inherently Governmental in nature, being so intimately related to 
the public interest as to mandate performance only by Federal 
employees. These functions are not in competition with the 
commercial sector. Therefore, these functions shall be 
performed by Government employees.  
 
Rely on the Commercial Sector. The Federal Government shall 
rely on commercially available sources to provide commercial 
products and services. In accordance with the provisions of this 
Circular and its Supplement, the Government shall not start or 
carry on any activity to provide a commercial product or service 
if the product or service can be procured more economically 
from a commercial source248.”  
 
 
 
Nevertheless, also the document cited above does not give a detailed directive on 
the question of which functions and tasks should be outsourced. However, the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Report states that only those functions directly linked to war 
fighting capability must be performed by government personnel249.  
 
As already mentioned, the Circular A-76 prescribes that only commercial activities 
and not inherently governmental might be performed by the public. Therefore it is 
important to differ between those two terms: 
 
Commercial activity is defined as follows: 
 
 
“Commercial activity relates to products or services that could be 
obtained from a commercial source. The OMB defines a 
commercial activity as anything that can be, could be, or should 
be contracted250.” 
                                                
248 OMB Circular No. A-76 (1999) 
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The proximate break describes inherently governmental activity 
“An inherently governmental activity is a function so intimately 
related to the public interest that it mandates performance by 
Federal employees. These functions include those activities that 
require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government 
authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions 
for the Government251.”  
Furthermore inherently governmental activities can be divided in two categories: 
The first one is 
“… the act of governing, or the discretionary exercise of 
governmental authority. Examples include criminal 
investigations, prosecutions and other judicial functions; 
management of programs requiring value judgments, such as 
the direction of the national defense; management and direction 
of the Armed Services; activities performed exclusively by 
military personnel who are subject to deployment in a combat, 
combat support or combat service support role; conduct of 
foreign relations; selection of program priorities; direction of 
Federal employees; regulation of the use of space, oceans, 
navigable rivers and other natural resources; direction of 
intelligence and counter-intelligence operations; and regulation 
of industry and commerce, including food and drugs252.” 
 
While the above pictured category mainly contains juridical and political tasks, the 
second one concentrates on the financial functions and is described as 
 
“… monetary transactions and entitlements, such as tax 
collection and revenue disbursements; control of the Treasury 
accounts and money supply; and the administration of public 
trusts253.” 
 
 
Summing up, it is anything but easy to draw a straight line between commercial 
activities that should be subject to A-76 cost comparisons and inherently 
governmental functions that should stay within the U.S. Army’s competence as tasks 
of those two fields often resemble and overlap254. Nevertheless, the Department of 
Defense’s intention to intensify outsourcing is obvious as the 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Report states that “only those functions that must be done at DoD should 
                                                
251 U.S. Department of Agriculture (2004a), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov 
252 OMB Circular No. A-76 Transmittal Memorandum #20 (1999) 
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be kept at DoD255”. Despite these rapid changes, the U.S. Army is still aware of a 
major culture change which accompanies the contracting out of functions. 
 
 
6.3 FAIRact – Preparatory work for A-76 
 
The already mentioned 1998 FAIRact requires federal agencies to submit each year 
a list of commercial activities performed by their employees and from which they 
thought that these activities would not be inherently governmental functions and 
might be also performed by the private sector at less cost, to the OMB256. A list of all 
activities that are judged not-inherently governmental has to be made available at 
each agency’s public webpage after OMB’s review and consultation257 unless the 
inventory information is classified or otherwise protected for national security 
reasons258. It is important to mention that this inventory list only accounts functions 
and not positions, as a federal employee may perform commercial and inherently 
governmental functions259. 
 
At the inception of the FAIRact in 1998, then U.S. President, Clinton said that  
 
"Government should be market-based — we should not be afraid of 
competition, innovation, and choice. I will open government to the 
discipline of competition260.”  
 
With that statement Clinton expressed that also the government is going to face 
competition and thus its commercial activities might be performed more efficient.  
 
However, FAIRact and Circular A-76 are not two non-matching subjects, as the 
1998 FAIRact not only states that government agencies have to list non-inherently 
governmental activities, it also obliges them to perform a competitive process to 
select their future source. This process has to be executed in accordance with the 
guidelines of OMB Circular A-76261, which implicates that the FAIRact represents 
preparatory work for A-76 cost comparisons.  
 
 
6.4 How does a cost-comparison process under A-76 work?  
 
Before explaining the details of such a process, it has to be declared that two 
different types of cost-comparisons under Circular A-76 exist. The standard A-76 
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Process is performed when the competition includes more than 65 FTEs, and an A-
76 streamlined competition is used when an agency tender will include an aggregate 
of 65 or fewer FTEs. FTE is a term that stands for the work of one staff person 
working a full-time work schedule for 1 year262.  
 
As the standard competition is more complex and also includes all parts of the 
streamlined process it is subject to be portrayed on the following pages. 
 
A standardized, structured process is required for determining the most efficient and 
cheapest supplier of commercial products and services, be it the public or the 
private sector. This process is divided into several stages which are presented in 
graphic and explanation above: 
 
 
 
Figure 14: The A-76 Standard Competition Process263
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
262 Comp. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1991), http://www.nrc.gov 
263 Department of Defense, Share A-76 (2004), http://emissary.acq.osd.mil 
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In order to indicate the streamlined processes less complexity another graph is very 
helpful: 
 
 
Figure 15: The A-76 Streamlined Competition Process264
 
The first phase in an A-76 standard competition process is the Preliminary Planning 
Phase in which the scopes of the activities and full time equivalents, which will be 
competed, have to be determined.  
 
The activity’s baseline costs as performed by the incumbent service provider as well 
as competition and completion schedules have to be set. Furthermore, competition 
officials, such as the agency tender official, the contracting officer, the source 
selection authority or the human resource advisor, have to be appointed by the 
Competitive Sourcing Official, who is an “an inherently governmental agency official 
responsible for the implementation of this circular within the agency265”.  
 
After the incumbent employees get informed that their function will be subject to a 
public-private competition a public announcement is made, which also sets the start 
of the cost-comparison-process.   
 
The next step is the development and the issue of the solicitation, which has to 
contain a Performance Work Statement (PWS), and which has to include reviews 
and comments by directly affected employees and representatives of directly 
affected employees. The PWS specifies the needs of the agency in its technical and 
functional nature, but does not mention any methods for meeting those 
requirements. Furthermore, it comprises certain Performance Standards which are 
“verifiable, measurable levels of service in terms of quantity, quality, timeliness, 
location, and work units266”. This solicitation is then the official document which has 
to be used by all potential bidders to formulate a proposal. 
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After the Competitive Sourcing Official received all offers, he performs the source 
selection. In the case an agency does not receive any tenders neither from the 
private sector nor from public reimbursable sources or if tenders other than the 
agency’s one are judged not responsible, the incumbent agency has to determine 
reasons for that behavior. The agency has to check for possible misleading parts in 
its solicitation and furthermore it has to take steps to amplify the competition. Then 
the Competitive Sourcing Official either has to revise the solicitation and start the 
competition afresh or to implement the agency’s tender. 
 
In the next step, the so-called Perform Source Selection, the agency determines the 
future provider of a commercial activity using one of several source selecting 
procedures that are described below: 
 
In the Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Source Selection the agency chooses 
the cheapest provider that is technically able to perform the commercial activity. 
Another source selection is the Phased Evaluation Source Selection Process in 
which the determination of the provider is split in two phases. Phase one merely 
treats the technical part of the performance and phase two is only concerned with 
the price of the offers by conducting price analysis and cost realism of all bidders. 
The decision is then made by the Competition Official using the results of both 
phases. The third possible selection process is called Tradeoff Source Selection 
Process and is used when an agency wants to consider awarding a contract to a 
potential provider that is not the cheapest one. When applying this decision process 
,the agency has to justify why it picked the Tradeoff Source Selection Process and it 
may only be exerted if the awarded contract does not surmount the agency’s 
budget. 
 
Although the solicitation implements certain rules about the extent and the 
specifications of the offered commercial activity alternate performance methods are 
licit. Therefore if an alternative tender is handed in the Competition Official has to 
evaluate it and to measure its precise cost and the difference in cost. Furthermore 
he has to clarify if an alternate bid’s costs are within the agency’s budget limitations.  
 
After the Perform Source Selection Phase is over, the actual decision to whom the 
contract is awarded is made by the Contracting Officer who selects the single 
contractor with the help of a decision-support software called COMPARE. This 
software integrates the costing procedures of the Circular and helps to calculate and 
document the costs in streamlined and standard competitions. Afterwards the 
agency has to make a formal public announcement, informing about its choice of the 
future provider of the commercial activity. In the next step, the contract is awarded to 
the winner- be it the government, the private sector or a public reimbursable 
provider - and the agency has to implement the performance decision267.  
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Usually there are three different kinds of bidders when a solicitation is published. 
First there is the government agency’s tender, second a private tender and third, the 
so-called Public Reimbursable Tender, which refers to a bidder that is a different 
federal agency than the incumbent268. In the following abstract these three tenders 
are explained more detailed: 
 
 
6.4.1 Government tender 
 
After the solicitation is issued, the Agency Tender Official, “an inherently 
governmental agency official with decision-making authority who represents the 
agency tender during source selection269” that also has to act like a potential 
vendor270, has to develop a tender for the government’s agency that complies with 
the solicitation and places the government in the best competitive position against 
the private sector bidders.  
 
In contrast to a private tender, whose characteristics will be portrayed in the 
following abstract, a public tender has to include a special statement called a Most 
Efficient Organization (MEO). This MEO exposes the agency’s most efficient and 
cost-effective organization, its quality control plan and copies of any subcontracts. In 
most cases it is not the incumbent organization that compiles the MEO, it is  
 
 
“…the product of management analyses that include, but are not 
limited to, activity based costing, business case analysis, 
consolidation, functionality assessment, industrial engineering, 
market research, productivity assessment, reengineering, 
reinvention, utilization studies, and value engineering271”. 
 
 
6.4.2 Private tender 
 
Non-Public offers have to be formulated under the same Performance Work 
Statement as the government’s tender and be submitted at the time fixed in the 
solicitation272. 
 
 
6.4.3 Public reimbursable tender 
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If other federal agencies respond to an agency’s solicitation its tender has to match 
the demanded requirements. In addition, it has to include a cost estimate, a quality 
control plan and copies of any existing, awarded contracts that are included in the 
tender.  
 
 
6.5 Post-process-performance – Importance of lessons learned 
 
After an A-76 cost-comparison process is done and a contract is awarded, it is 
elemental to measure the performance of the process and its’ winner. It is an 
agency’s duty to document faults made and lessons learned and to publish them on 
SHARE A-76 which is the Department of Defense’s web page on knowledge and 
experience about the A-76 cost comparison process. In addition a Competitive 
Sourcing Quarterly Report has to be submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget by the end of each fiscal quarter. 
 
Another major post-process task of the agency is the monitoring of the service 
provider’s performance by implementing a quality assurance surveillance plan. An 
example of a lesson learned in an A-76 process is the different determination of 
employee’s wages by the various bidders. As in the United States white-collar 
workers are paid under another wage system, namely the General Schedule (GS) 
system, than blue-collar workers, namely the Federal Wage System (FWS)273, 
results in the bids can differ distinctively and have a negative effect on the tender.  
 
A further suggestion for an improvement is that submissions of tenders should be 
handed in not only in hard copy, but in digital format such as a CD-ROM, in order to 
allow word searches which are helpful to the Competition Official274. 
 
 
6.6 Improving competitive sourcing – Improving outsourcing 
 
The OMB’s Circular A-76 has been updated and revised several times in the last 
decade after it had taken numerous critics from different sources. A Commercial 
Activities Panel (CAP) which is realized in the Government Accountability Office, 
formerly known as General Accounting Office, and consists of experts who “study 
the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial activities for the 
federal government from government personnel to a federal contractor275” was 
implemented in order to examine the cost-comparison process. The CAP’s entity is 
established in Section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
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2001 and published in the Federal Register276. In 2002, the CAP released the final 
report on Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Government which stated that  
 
  
“the execution of public-private cost comparison studies 
conducted under rules set out in the Office of  
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 and its 
Supplemental Handbook has been under fire from all 
sides.  
Federal managers and others have been concerned 
about the organizational turbulence that typically follows 
the announcement of A-76 studies. Government workers 
have been concerned about the impact of competition on 
their jobs, the opportunity for input into the process, and 
the lack of parity with industry offerors to protest A-76 
decisions.  
Industry representatives have complained about 
unfairness in the process and the lack of a level playing 
field between the government and the private sector in 
accounting for costs. Concerns also have been raised 
about the adequacy of oversight of subsequent 
performance, whether by the public or private sector.  
The government’s goal is and always should be to obtain 
high-quality services at a reasonable cost. Stated 
differently, the government should strive to achieve 
outcomes that represent the best deal for the taxpayer. 
Achieving this goal is a significant challenge277.”  
 
 
The abstract above underlines the difficulties and troubles which occurred in A-76 
cost-comparison processes. It is utmost apparent and of particular interest that not 
only one party criticized the process but that all of them, be it the public or the 
private sector, expressed their disapproval. The CAP held eleven meetings and its 
members included governmental representatives as well as knowledgeable 
individuals. In its counselling, the panel appointed ten so-called sourcing principles, 
which should serve as guidelines for improves future cost comparisons under 
Circular A-76278: 
 
1. Support agency missions, goals, and objectives. 
 
2. Be consistent with human capital practices designed to 
attract, motivate, retain, and reward a high performing 
federal workforce. 
 
3. Recognize that inherently governmental and certain 
other functions should be performed by federal workers. 
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4. Create incentives and processes to foster high-
performing, efficient, and effective organizations 
throughout the federal government. 
 
5. Be based on a clear, transparent, and consistently 
applied process. 
6. Avoid arbitrary full-time equivalent or other arbitrary 
numerical goals. 
 
7. Establish a process that, for activities that may be 
performed by either the public or the private sector, would 
permit public and private sources to participate in 
competitions for work currently performed in-house, work 
currently contracted to the private sector, and new work, 
consistent with these guiding principles. 
 
8. Ensure that, when competitions are held, they are 
conducted as fairly, effectively, and efficiently as possible. 
 
9. Ensure that competitions involve a process that 
considers both quality and cost factors. 
 
10. Provide for accountability in connection with all 
sourcing decisions. 279
 
 
Above listed points merely concentrate on improvements in the process itself. 
Therefore GAO also suggested general improvements on out-contracting. Several 
activities at government agencies were bundled into one package for competition in 
the past what limited small businesses participation, as such companies do not have 
that large capacities to fulfill the needs of big contracts. In order to support them, 
some agencies, as for instance the U.S. Air Force, implemented an office that helps 
small business to team up for them to become able to participate in huge A-76 
competitions. Furthermore, GAO criticized the long duration that A-76 processes 
can have. To shorten them, the Department of Defense submitted that bidders 
should do oral presentations of their proposals rather than delivering large written 
bids280.   
 
Concerning the improvement of cost-comparisons, the Department of Defense has 
taken steps towards quality standards when conducting A-76 cost-comparisons. 
According to Department of Defense officials “less oversight of contractor 
performance would be necessary if they required contractors to be certified as 
meeting quality standards281”. Although government agencies have had little 
experience with quality standards such as the ISO 9000, a standard that is awarded 
from the non-governmental organization International Organization for Standards, its 
policy’s aim is to implement them282. Certainly, the requirement of ISO 9000 
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certification could enhance the quality of tenders, yet it must be mentioned that such 
a certificate costs between US$22.000 and US$32.000, an amount not all bidding 
companies are willing or able to spend on283.  
                                                
283 Comp. Friel, B. (1999), in Government Executive Magazine (1999) 
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7 PMCs’  and the law – a troubled issue 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
“…international law, as it stands now, is too primitive in this area 
(annotation from author: in the Private Military Industry) to 
handle such a complex issue that has emerged just in the last 
decade284.” 
 
 
As Peter Singer of Washington D.C.’s Brookings Institute, a notable independent 
research organization, states, legal regulation for the private military branch 
represents a troubled issue as it is immature and vaguely authored. This obscure 
situation does not only occur in the case of the United States and its outsourcing-
process as it is even more a global challenge concerning numerous governments 
and multinational companies. The following chapter pictures the history of law 
concerning privatized military actions, numerates its problems and ramifications as 
well as it gives proposals for possible solutions285.  
 
7.2 History of law concerning private military actors  
 
Established on October 18th 1907 in the Dutch town of The Hague, which is today 
the official seat of the International Criminal Court, a paper titled Rights and Duties 
of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land represents the first legal 
framework for international law286. The so called Hague Conventions implemented 
juridical standards for countries and its citizens that are neutral to and not 
participating in the war287. On one hand article four states that “corps of combatants 
cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power 
to assist the belligerents288”, on the other hand article five does not prohibit nationals 
from neutral countries to participate in a war on a belligerent’s side: “The 
responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the 
frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents289”. Finally article 
17 equates the positions of soldiers and neutral participants in war and also 
specifies that a fighting neutral cannot invoke neutrality of his home country290.  
 
The 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 
August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention III) was a further big step in international law 
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for wartimes as it established the rights for Prisoners of War. This term included the 
following persons: 
 
“Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well 
as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such 
armed forces…;…members of other militias and members of 
other volunteer corps… fulfil the following conditions… that of 
being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates…291” 
 
 
The quotation above states that as long as participants in war were part of a legal 
army of a nation taking part in the battle, they were qualified for the status of 
Prisoner of War. Private military actors, if sanctioned by a government, were thus 
included as the Convention lists  
 
“persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being 
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft 
crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour 
units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, 
provided that they have received authorization, from the armed 
forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that 
purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model292.” 
 
Establishing the Prisoner of War status was a big attainment as it declared 
internationally valid laws for imprisoned persons during war for the first time.  
 
Nevertheless, rules for control and interdiction of private war fighters were not 
included. In the following the most important points of the rights and special 
treatment of Prisoners of War are enumerated: 
 
 
 
“Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. 
Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power 
causing death or seriously endangering the health of a 
prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be 
regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. 
In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to 
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments 
of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental 
or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and 
carried out in his interest. Likewise, prisoners of war must 
at all times be protected, particularly against acts of 
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violence or intimidation and against insults and public 
curiosity293.” 
 
 
In the 1950s, and the following two decades many PMCs operated in multitudinous 
violent conflicts especially in those of African states. The United Nations reacted to 
this tapering situation by publishing the Declaration of Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 1970 that 
disapproved the use of mercenaries against movements of national liberation294. 
This document was a step towards the ban of mercenary yet it left out regulations 
for international enforcement. 
 
In 1977 the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts established a 
definition for mercenaries. It was then a major step in the legal regulation for 
persons in war as it distinguished mercenaries from Prisoners of War and 
particularly excluded them from special treatments listed beneath: 
 
 
“1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of war. 
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an 
armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a 
Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess 
of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and 
functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; 
and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict 
on official duty as a member of its armed forces295.” 
 
 
Nevertheless, this protocol was criticized by some governments as they assessed 
the definition as “unworkable for practical purposes296” meaning that it would not 
been applicable due to the following reasons: 
 
First, it is more than difficult to canvass the motivation to “take part in the hostilities 
essentially by the desire for private gain297” of someone incriminated of 
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mercenarism. Secondly, the definition of mercenaries in this document is 
cumulative, what means that only if all above mentioned points apply to someone he 
is defined a mercenary298. Thirdly, smart formulated contracts between 
Governments and PMCs may exclude employees from being defined as 
mercenaries. Exemplarily, in 1997, in the case of Papua New Guinea private military 
workers were either defined as Special Constables or granted the Papuan 
citizenship in order to circumvent a possible accusation299. This was then possible 
as the Geneva Convention requires someone accused of mercenary activities to be 
“neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a 
party to the conflict300”. 
 
Not only worldwide movements to obtain control over mercenaries but also national 
steps were undertaken. Especially in Africa a need to regulate mercenaries existed, 
as their services were frequently used by rebel groups as well as by governments. 
For instance during the Congo crisis in the 1960s, president Mobuto and his 
opponents employed mercenaries in order to support their own troops301. 
 
In 1977, the same year as the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions was 
adopted, the Organization of African Unity established the Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa as numerous African states faced threats to 
their independence, territorial integrity and development by mercenaries. Article 6 of 
the document states the following: 
 
 
“Obligations of States 
 
The contracting parties shall take all necessary measures to 
eradicate all mercenary activities in Africa. 
 
To this end, each contracting State shall undertake to: 
 
(a) Prevent its nationals or foreigners on its territory from 
engaging in any of the acts mentioned in Article 1 of this 
Convention; 
 
(b) Prevent entry into or passage through its territory of any 
mercenary or any equipment destined for mercenary use; 
 
(c) Prohibit on its territory any activities by persons or 
organisations who use mercenaries against any African 
State member of the Organization of African Unity or the 
people of Africa in their struggle for liberation; 
 
(d) Communicate to the other Member States of the 
Organization of African Unity either directly or through the 
Secretariat of the OAU any information related to the 
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activities of mercenaries as soon as it comes to its 
knowledge; 
 
(e) Forbid on its territory the recruitment, training, financing 
and equipment of mercenaries and any other form of 
activities likely to promote mercenarism; 
 
(f) Take all the necessary legislative and other measures to 
ensure the immediate entry into force of this Convention302.” 
 
 
This document rigorously urged to stop mercenary activities in Africa as it states that 
even capital punishment should be performed if the laws of the convention are not 
redeemed303. Though it also prohibited the recruitment and training of mercenaries 
as well as any mercenary activities on African territory it did not explicitly forbid the 
use of mercenaries for the defense against “dissident groups within their own 
borders304”. Latest, which then were rebel groups that fought against their own 
governments, were pushed back by mercenaries organized by Angola and Zaire. 
Furthermore to this half-hearted manoeuvre against mercenary still enforcement 
was the big problem. The Organization of African Unity relied on its member states 
to apply the new legal regulations yet those mostly ignored the out comings of the 
convention305.    
 
The latest legal work on mercenaries is the 1989 International Convention against 
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries that was established 
by the United Nations. It tried to improve the existing legal situation by setting up 
new definitions of mercenary activities and consequences those had to face who 
would not obey the rules.  
 
Article 1 states that 
 
  
“1. A mercenary is any person who: 
 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an 
armed conflict; 
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of 
a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in 
excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and 
functions in the armed forces of that party; 
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a party to the conflict; 
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; 
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and 
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict 
on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
 
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of 
participating in a concerted act of violence 
aimed at : 
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the 
constitutional order of a State; or 
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; 
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment 
of material compensation; 
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which 
such an act is directed; 
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose 
territory the act is undertaken306.” 
 
 
The document not only states that nations should avoid the recruitment of 
mercenaries but should also prevent mercenary preparations307.  
 
Likewise, as the already portrayed conventions of Geneva 1949 and 1977, also the 
1989 convention did not have a major impact on the diminishment of mercenary 
activities. Though all three documents established regulations seeming to be 
appropriate to gain control, the implementation was quite weak. One major reason 
was that all conventions’ definitions of mercenaries were cumulative. That means 
that all requirements listed have to be met by an individual to be termed mercenary. 
Experts on this topic stated that “it is very, very hard to find a mercenary anywhere 
that fits all these criteria308”. 
 
Concerning the 1989 convention there were two other particular reasons why the 
complex legal situation over private military actors did not improve. The first one was 
that - at that time - private military companies sprung up and substituted mercenary 
activities and the second was that the convention was not ratified until 2001 when 
Costa Rica was the twenty-second nation to sign it309. 
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7.3 Present legal situation 
 
Taking all attempts into account that tried to ban mercenary for nearly a century, 
starting at the 1907 The Hague paper and ending with the 1989 United Nations 
convention, none of them really managed to achieve its goal. The major reason for 
this situation is the lack of an appropriate international and all-industry overarching 
legal system that regulates private military actors and its mostly negative 
ramifications. 
 
Concerning the existing law, it is relevant to mention that it mainly aims at individual 
actors thus on mercenaries who operate on their own risk and account, and not on 
private military companies. Singer even says that “the privatized military industry lies 
outside the full domain of all of these existing legal regimes310”. Furthermore he 
states that the developed law links the action of mercenaries to a single conflict, yet 
PMCs contract their employees for longer duration and thereby bypass legal 
enforcement.  
 
Another vital point is that most PMCs do not exactly take part in fighting but their 
operations are still inherently military in nature. Even though they are not all acting 
at the front also their other activities are of major importance in warfare as PMCs 
take over tasks such as military training, providing of logistics or technical support, 
all particularly necessary for participating in armed conflicts. A further aspect is the 
troubled enforcement of existing law. Some nations might be able to implement legal 
definitions and enforce them, but as those companies act on an international level, 
world-wide enforcement is more than doubtful. Additionally numerous states simply 
ignore the existence of private military companies. As a consequence of both, the 
non-existence of proper law and the lack of clearly defined enforcement regulations, 
the private military industry represents a  branch which is not limited by law but by 
simple economics. Singer thinks “if laws are absent, unclear, or seen as 
inappropriate, the respect for them and their resultant effectiveness certainly will be 
diminished311”. Moreover, he even states that “the general absence of law within this 
critical realm stands as a clear challenge to the belief that legal norms underscore 
good behavior in the international arena312”.  
 
PMCs are also often able to circumvent law because they are formally contracted by 
governments and thus they “represent quasi-state actors in the international arena, 
which takes them outside the mercenary concerns of the international 
community313”. As some contracts are approved and authorized by a government 
companies claim a state’s official allowance and thereby they cannot be treated 
under international law. 
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Summing up all given arguments, it seems apparent that PMCs are not seriously 
hampered by governments or institutions in their operations. There is little interest in 
enforcing the regulations as not only PMCs but also governments profit from private 
military activities314. 
 
7.4 Attempts for legal regulation 
7.4.1 U.S. legal regulations 
 
Also the United States’ legal regulations concerning private military actors have 
been and still are weak. The first Neutrality Act of 1794 declared that individual 
preparations for or departures to an international conflict were an impropriety315. The 
following four Neutrality Acts of the 1930s prohibited the recruitment of mercenaries 
yet they did not forbid the sale of military services. Moreover, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, federal law enacted by the United States Congress and furthermore 
the foundation for the United States military justice system includes punishment for 
crimes committed by U.S. Military members but does not cover any violations of 
civilian employees316. In order to close this gap, the 2000 Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act stated that also civilians contracted by the U.S. Department of 
Defense should be punished if they committed criminal acts outside the United 
States: 
 
 
“Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that 
would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for 
more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States…while employed by or accompanying…shall be 
punished as provided for that offense317.” 
 
 
The problem with the above stated law is that it only applies to persons that are 
directly employed by the U.S. Department of Defense and accused of violations 
committed on U.S. facilities. It neither covers personnel working for other federal 
institutions, such as the FBI or the CIA, nor does it include U.S. workers employed by 
foreign governments or companies.  
 
Even U.S. Army officials consider the new legal regulations being troubled. Major 
Joseph Perlak, who is a Judge Advocate with the U.S. Marine Corps, thinks that  
 
“… there is a dearth of doctrine, procedure, and policy on just 
how this new criminal statute will affect the way the military does 
business with contractors. Equally unclear is how the Act will 
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affect the actions of contractor employees and the commanders 
they support overseas318.” 
 
 
In addition, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act states that if an employee of a 
private contractor is accused of violence and does not apply to the standards of the 
act, which is often the case, a prosecution has to be performed by the conflict’s host 
nation319. Although this regulation seems to be effective, as it regulates prosecutions 
of war criminals, it has little effect. The first reason why is that most host states do 
not want to try a PMC or its employees if latter are contracted by themselves as that 
would harm their operation. The inability of challenging violators is the second 
reason. As in many areas where conflicts occur also the legal system collapses, trials 
are very unlikely to be performed. Another reason for the failing of the Act is given in 
the situation of a PMC fighting a government. Peter Singer gives the example of an 
American PMC operating on Iraqi territory: The company would hardly have removed 
its employees to the government of Saddam Hussein for a process executed by the 
Iraqi host nation if they had committed war crimes320.  
 
In various situations where PMCs’ employees were found to have committed felonies 
in foreign countries their employers soon removed them from the nation in order to 
avoid detention or a process by the host nation’s courts321. Gordon Campbell of the 
United States Army Combined Arms Support Command is very concerned when it 
comes to the prosecution of criminal offenses in regions other than the United States. 
He says that: 
 
 
 
“… this lack of application of U.S. criminal law outside of our 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, when combined with 
the reluctance of some host countries to prosecute Americans 
for these offenses (particularly if they were committed against 
fellow Americans--soldier or civilian), creates an environment 
where civilians are untouchable despite commission of what 
would be serious crimes within the U.S.  While, if there is a host 
nation, political pressure can be brought to bear for them to 
prosecute, the same is not true if there is no host nation.  If a 
contractor commits an offense while supporting a military 
operation in a country hostile to the U.S., it is inconceivable he 
would be turned over to the enemy to be prosecuted. 
Additionally, as in the case of Somalia, what if there is no 
government?  A contractor, there to support the U.S. national 
interest, could murder, rape, pillage and plunder with complete, 
legal unaccountability322.” 
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Not only legal actions concerning individuals are posing a problem also laws dealing 
with PMCs are very controversial. In the case of an U.S. company supplying 
services outside the United States, for instance to a foreign government or to other 
organizations abroad, it has to get licensed by the U.S. Government. However, 
these licensing-processes though are not very effective as Deborah Avant, an 
associate professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School 
of International Affairs at the George Washington University, states:  
 
 
“The Defense and State department offices that have input 
into the process vary from contract to contract, and neither 
the companies nor independent observers are exactly clear 
about how the process works323.” 
 
 
Further on, a PMC planning to operate abroad is not obliged to notify the Congress 
and apply for a license if the amount of the contract does not exceed the amount of 
US$50 million. As most contracts are below this sum and as several actual bigger 
ones are split up in order to circumvent the notification a lot of contracts are not 
observed. As a consequence of this law even the Pentagon had to confess that it 
does not know exactly how many PMC workers it would employ324. 
 
The licensing process is performed by the State Department under the International 
Transfer of Arms Regulations which implement the Arms Export Control Act325. In 
case a company once needs a license and gets it awarded no further requirements 
are prescribed nor does anyone supervise how the operations are carried out. 
Merely U.S. embassies are beholden to general oversight of PMC’s operations in 
their assigned countries yet no official is instructed to be responsible for the 
monitoring of such activities. Concerning this situation a U.S. State Department 
official said that “our job is to protect Americans, not investigate Americans326”. 
 
Finally, also the U.S. Army itself considers problems that may occur at international 
operations as a regulation for the provision of civil logistics states the following: 
 
“In an area of operations where an international agreement 
authorizes the presence of US forces (…) or regulates their 
status (…), the status of contractors and their employees, 
under local law, must also be established by international 
agreement. Contract provisions or military regulations 
denoting the contractor as “part of the force” will not suffice 
to establish such status. When relevant agreements do not 
address the issue of status for contractors and their 
employees, the contractor may be unable to perform. If able 
to perform, the costs may be prohibitive. In the absence of a 
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controlling agreement, a corporate contractor may be unable 
to gain entry into the foreign country or, if allowed to enter, 
may be treated, under local law, as a foreign corporation and 
subjected to local regulation, taxation and customs 
restrictions. Similarly, in the absence of agreement, the 
contractor’s employees may be unable to enter the foreign 
country or, if allowed to enter, may be subjected to 
restrictions imposed on foreign labor. Additionally, unless 
otherwise provided by international agreement, neither the 
contractor, nor its employees, will enjoy any immunity from 
local civil or criminal jurisdiction and will be ineligible to 
receive customs or tax-free logistic support from the US 
forces327.” 
 
 
On the one hand, the absence of appropriate law that aims on private military actors 
and on the other hand, the not overly intense intentions of establishing such a legal 
framework in the United States already led to a situation in which shady business 
policies are ordinary and moreover punishment for improper practices almost does 
not exist. 
 
7.4.2 Other national legal regulations 
 
Not only the United States, but some other countries struck out on their own. 
Already in 1870, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Enlistment Act states that enlisting 
as a mercenary in the U.K. and as well in other territories is considered being an 
offence. Despite this, many British have though individually participated in 
mercenary activities, because since the act was implemented not one single 
prosecution was performed328. In 2002, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
published a Green Paper, a consultative document, as a response to a Foreign 
Affairs Committee report on mercenary in Africa. It states that although numerous 
governments are aware of troubled activities performed by PMCs, no jurisdiction 
exists that directs at a regulation. As this paper is only a guideline for the control of 
private military companies operating outside the U.K., it has no direct effect and as it 
is not representing valid law it is not subject to be obeyed by the companies. 
Nevertheless, it delineates the scope of possible government actions and offers 
different options for regulations, such as a ban on military activity abroad, a ban on 
recruitment for military activity abroad, a licensing regime for military services or 
self-regulation by introducing a voluntary code of conduct. The Green Paper 
enumerates arguments for and against above mentioned options and is also aware 
of the complexity of setting up regulations.329 Although this paper was a first step of 
the British government in order to create a legal framework it was heavily criticized 
by the opposition330.  
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Australia’s commitment to a ban of mercenaries is weaker than the British’s. The 
Australian Crimes, Foreign Incursions and Recruitment Act of 1978 states that it is 
permitted to recruit mercenaries within Australian territory but it does not say that 
overseas recruitment is forbidden331. 
 
 
On the contrary to Australia several African countries which represented scenes for 
violent and armed conflicts with PMCs and mercenaries participating throughout the 
last decades, tried to set up a legal framework aiming at those actors. In 1997, the 
South African government made an attempt to stop private military operations and 
their accompanying negative effects such as the over- and senseless use of 
weapons by establishing the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill. It states 
that: 
 
 
“No person may within the Republic or elsewhere offer to render 
any foreign military assistance to any state or organ of state, 
group or person or other entity or person unless he or she has 
been granted authorisation to offer such assistance…,… to 
render any foreign military assistance to any state or organ of 
state, group or person or other entity or person unless such 
assistance is rendered in accordance with an agreement…332” 
 
 
The above mentioned term foreign military assistance includes the training of 
persons for, the financing of and direct participation in mercenary activities. Although 
the act was established to comprise the control over every single private military 
activity it was not very successful. The broad definition of foreign military assistance 
required the approval of many actual non-inherently military contracts such as those 
of non-governmental organizations involved in conflict prevention and those of 
workers for aid organizations. The second troubled issue of the South African 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill was the fact that many PMCs that 
were affected by the bill moved to neighbouring countries and settled their business 
their in order to be still legally able to operate333.  
 
Peter Singer is convinced that national attempts of gaining control over private 
military companies are bounded: 
 
 
“In sum, the ability of states to control the privatized military 
industry at the national level is limited. The environs in which 
they work are often institutionally weak and, hence, there are 
limited means to monitor firms properly. This vacuum leaves 
regulation by their home states as a possible recourse. 
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However, the very form of the PMF (Private Military Firms) gives 
it the ability to defeat almost any attempts at strict legal controls 
at this level. Problems arising from the extraterritorial nature of 
their operations and the overall weakness of state ordinances 
also mitigate any efforts at establishing and regulating the legal 
status of firms at the domestic level334.” 
 
 
His statement once more underlines that the success of well-meant national 
attempts for legal regulation of PMCs nearly always fail due to the non-existence of 
a coordinated international approach to control this controversial branch. Also, one 
PMC already mentioned, namely Sandline International, is convinced that an 
international regulation committee would be a notch above domestic attempts. The 
company argues as follows: 
 
 
“Most PMCs operate from offices and facilities located in 
developed countries.  By their very nature, these countries enjoy 
the most developed legislatures and already have statutes in 
place to prevent what would generally be regarded as 
unacceptable activities being undertaken from within their 
borders. …However, PMCs can become very nomadic in order 
to evade nationally applied legislation which they regard as 
inappropriate or excessive.  Therefore, what is really required is 
not so much legislation to control these businesses at the places 
where they have established their corporate bases but a general 
set of rules governed by an international body such as the UN or 
the International Court in The Hague which covers the 
conditions under which they can operate.  This international 
oversight has the added advantage of ensuring that there is a 
level worldwide playing field for the regulation of PMCs as 
procedures introduced at the national level may be more or less 
punitive in one environment than in another335.” 
 
 
7.4.3 International regulations 
 
The alarming situation of PMCs and their legal status evidently postulates the need 
for a legal framework. As already pictured, domestic efforts mostly miscarried and 
therefore an international jurisdiction and enforcement legislation is the only solution 
to get a grip on PMCs. Such a provision could either aim to the total ban of private 
military actions or attempt to establish certain rules under which PMCs would be 
allowed to operate.  
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Sandline Inc., a PMC that for instance operated in Sierra Leone in 1997336, even 
reports that it had to close its business in 2004, due to the failing of an international 
regime. Since then its’ webpage explains the closure:  
 
 
“On 16 April 2004 Sandline International announced the closure 
of the company's operations. The general lack of governmental 
support for Private Military Companies willing to help end armed 
conflicts in places like Africa, in the absence of effective 
international intervention, is the reason for this decision. Without 
such support the ability of Sandline to make a positive difference 
in countries where there is widespread brutality and genocidal 
behaviour is materially diminished.337” 
 
 
In the following paragraph, three options for international regulations, either a total 
ban, the establishment of laws for a regulated business or a voluntary code of 
conduct are detailed explained. 
 
The leadoff method, an outright prohibition, would provide the benefit of obviation of 
any private military activity, yet the following fronting difficulties make such a ban 
almost impossible: 
 
First, a prohibition would come into conflict with countries’ right to self-defense which 
is stated in article 51 of the U.N. Charter:  
 
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security338.” 
 
 
Further on, weak nations which are not able to defend themselves and are not 
subject to international help would not be allowed to gather support and thereby be 
unprivileged by such a ban. 
 
Nowadays PMCs are part of legitimate international business and often increasingly 
contribute to multinational companies’ turnovers. A ban would withdraw sales and as 
a concomitant phenomenon ten-thousands of employments would be deleted which 
would result in a rising unemployment rate. In addition a wide-spread ban could as 
well include activities of humanitarian organizations, as they often operate in conflict 
zones, and thereby make their services illegal. Another problem when introducing a 
total prohibition is the displeasure of its implementation by several countries and 
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their national economies that profit from PMCs and additionally depend on them in 
order to be able to fulfill their duty of ensuring security. The government of the 
United States is an epitome as it sent private contractors to all international conflicts 
since the second Gulf War in 1991339. 
 
As the option portrayed above that prohibits all private military activities does not 
seem to be a proper solution permitting private military operations when under 
control of a legal regime might offer an alternative of regulation. Not only 
governments and non-governmental organizations but also companies acting in this 
complex branch have put forward proposals for control mechanisms. Peter Singer 
strongly recommends the implementation of a regulating committee: 
 
 
“The findings of this task force ultimately could become the core 
of an international office designated to handle such issues on a 
normalized basis. It would help fill the present void in monitoring 
mechanisms340.” 
 
 
This task force should be an international entity and could be performed under the 
custody of the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries who is 
now Enrique Bernales Ballesteros of Peru. It should establish a standard, set up by 
a highly qualified team including all affected parties in this issue such as 
international experts, governments, PMCs and non-governmental organizations that 
must be achieved by companies willing to operate in this branch. This organization 
could become an international office that is responsible for the handling of such 
issues on a standardized basis and would be able to allow or prohibit business 
contracts between governments or other entities and private military companies. 
Further on, it should function as an auditing committee that judges PMCs on their 
business policies and international military standards. Companies would have to 
permit auditors sufficient insight into their organizations so that they are able to 
unveil any illegal machination. Every single contract should be proved by the 
committee in order to scotch contracts with clients whose policies contradict public 
good.  
 
Only equipped with power and rights mentioned above, an international taskforce 
would represent an authority that is taken serious by private military companies and 
governments. Additionally the committee could create databases of companies and 
its employees operating in this branch, in order to have information about their past 
violation of human rights and their organizational structure and ownership. Another 
task would be the governance of contracts made with private military companies and 
the assignment of independent military observers. Further on, inspections should 
contain the detailed examination of employees’ resumes in order to ban violators of 
human rights from scratch. If once a violation is committed through an employee to 
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human beings, he should be subject to The Hague’s International Court of 
Justice.341  
 
Once a PMC is sanctioned for its operations from the task force it should be assured 
that its activities are always performed under the rules of the regime. Unannounced 
observations of contract’s prosecution should be performed in certain intervals and 
would contribute to avoid any breach of contractual obligation. In addition long-
lasting allowances should not be granted as companies could change their 
standards of operations. Concerning punishments Singer says that PMCs are in 
favor of market-based penalties, such as financial penalizations or the deletion of 
their firms on the international body’s list of sanctioned businesses. This might only 
be suitable if companies fail in monetary parts of a contract but not be appropriate if 
human rights are violated. Singer proposes that both firms and their employees 
should agree with the committee that a breach of the contract should be subject to 
the courts of the host nation of the operation or the International Criminal Court. 
Above all, it is important that any regimentation made would need to be 
implemented on a global level to be effective. Though most PMCs prefer self-
regulation and disclaim an international controlling body as portrayed above, 
Sandline International favours an outside neutral regulation. On their homepage 
they criticize private businesses unwilling to subject to international control and 
picture them as follows: 
 
 
“Many PMCs state that they apply a degree of self-regulation 
which obviates the need for external oversight and control.  They 
will say that their internal procedures and practices are based on 
those of the first world army(s) which are the source of their 
manpower supply.  They argue that they operate within a code 
of ethics and discipline, in such areas as determining who they 
can and who they cannot work for, when their services are no 
longer required and how their personnel behave once deployed 
in theatre that is more than adequate.  They will say that, in the 
event that they or a competitor breaches this basic code, they 
become exposed to the full force of both the national laws of 
their home country as well as international law342.” 
 
 
Sandline further questions why PMCs threat regulation when they are convinced to 
operate on legal conditions. In their point of view private companies should have no 
reason to fear external regulation and monitoring343. Additional to the two 
possibilities of an international approach towards establishing proper business 
policies in the private military industry, the idea of a total ban and the option of strict 
legal regulations, there is a third way to reach this goal. A code of conduct, which is 
a voluntary guideline that organizations agree to follow, could be implemented. Such 
an agreement was already established once before by the International Peace 
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Operations Association (IPOA), which is a “non-profit organization of companies, 
individuals and non-governmental organizations who provide services related to 
conflict alleviation and avoidance, post-conflict reconstruction, and emergency 
humanitarian rescue worldwide344”. By setting up the following code of conduct the 
IPOA aims at the implementation of industry-wide standards of professional military 
practices and policies345: 
 
 
Human Rights 
In all their operations, signatories will strictly adhere to all 
relevant international laws and protocols on human rights. 
They will take every practicable measure to minimize loss of 
life and destruction of property. Signatories involved in 
armed operations will follow the United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the Geneva 
Conventions in the propagation of that conflict, and will seek 
a swift, equitable and beneficial conclusion. … 
Clients 
Signatories pledge to work only for legitimate, recognized 
governments, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations. Signatories will refuse to 
engage clients who are actively thwarting international efforts 
towards peace.… 
Ethics 
Signatories recognize that the services they provide are 
necessary for ending conflicts and alleviating associated 
human suffering, but not sufficient in themselves. Therefore, 
signatories pledge to work closely with groups and 
organizations specializing in reconciliation and reconstruction 
to bring conflicts to a permanent and just end.  
Support of International Organizations and NGOs 
Signatories pledge to support the work of other international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations working 
to mitigate or end conflicts. Increasingly chaotic conflicts 
have made such work increasingly difficult and hazardous. 
Where feasible, signatories will offer necessary security, aid, 
and even rescue and evacuation if required, subject to their 
contractual arrangements with the client… 
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7.5 Conclusion – Possible solutions 
 
As well the above stated code of conduct is meant it is not very effective as it 
presents a voluntary code. IPOA members either apply to it or not, but they do not 
have to fear legal prosecution as the code is not implemented in any domestic or 
international law. Also, the idea of a total ban does not represent an useful method 
of getting control over PMCs as the private military branch is already such an 
integral part of international business which also could not be thought away. 
According to Wulf, commercialization and internationalization of security led to a 
situation in which some armies could not do without PMCs346.  
 
Therefore an international regulating body, its functions, duties and rights should be 
established under international law. All countries should furthermore accept this 
entity in order to permit worldwide ratification. 
 
Sanctioning companies that obey certain legal guidelines could benefit both, the 
auditioning body and the PMCs. Latter would be respected as internationally 
attested companies and thereby their reputation in the business world would 
increase. This case would help private military entities to get into business with 
governments or organizations that formerly suspended PMCs from competition due 
to their concerns of some companies’ bad image and improper methods. Also, 
sanctioned businesses could then be contracted by the United Nations for 
peacekeeping operations and further, also non-armed, operations. In addition, 
participation in humanitarian work could portray a still unsullied market segment. 
The controlling entity’s benefit would be the improvement of knowledge of the 
branch and the ability to avoid problems as they occur nowadays. Further on, the 
United Nations would have access to approved companies that could be awarded 
contracts for peace-keeping missions. The British Green Paper is even in favor of 
PMCs taking over U.N. missions: 
 
 
“…since the UN … has great difficulties in recruiting forces for 
peacekeeping operations in the first place, it is rarely able to 
hold the providing states to account. A private company which 
had an interest in continuing business for the UN could be held 
to much higher standards – and these would include standards 
on behaviour and human rights as well as efficiency in carrying 
out agreed tasks347.” 
 
 
Also, the United Nations are eager to employ private contractors. In 1998, U.N. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that he had thought about contracting private 
firms in peace missions. He stated that they could have helped to increase the 
situation of Rwandan refugee camps, where refugees were threatened by fighters, 
but did not send them, as he thought that the world was not ready to privatize 
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peace348. Not only governments or international institutions, but also experts on the 
branch are convinced that PMCs would succeed where the United Nations fail and 
therefore private operators should be used by them to support peace missions349. 
The implementation of an international committee overseeing PMCs and the 
standards it should set, is arrogated by various sides. However, until now no step 
was taken to realize this. The reasons therefore are manifold: 
 
First, governments’ indignation to establish external regulation puts an end to the 
process before it has even started. As the past has shown, nations are the best 
clients for private military businesses. Previous examples, such as those of activities 
in Africa throughout the last decades, and recent ones as for instance operations in 
Balkan states or in Iraq, underline the boom of PMCs in armed and non-armed 
operations. Nowadays, governments already depend on external support as their 
defense budgets are shrinking350 and private contractors are mostly able to operate 
cheaper and more efficient. In addition, outsourcing of military activities minimizes 
the risk of casualties of a nation’s soldiers aside saving costs. Several cases of 
violations of human rights in private military activities show351 that policies and 
behavior of PMCs are very troubled. Despite the bad image PMCs order books are 
still full as merely a weak reputation does not put a company out of business. As 
long as no major outcry occurs, governments will rely on civilian support and deny 
international regulation that could end PMCs sometimes doubtful performance and 
support of governments’ interests abroad352. However, not only cost savings and 
deporting dirty work are states’ reasons for contracting out. Some developing 
countries, for instance Sierra Leone, do not have the power to defend themselves 
and need civilian contractors in order to back rebels353.  
 
Secondly, international institutions, such as the United Nations or the European 
Community do not agitate too much in the matter of establishing jurisdiction 
concerning PMCs. In its present version the E.U. treaty does not deal with military 
services at all, it merely regulates the production and trade of war material354. In the 
case of the United Nations another situation could hamper the foundation of 
legislation. As decisions are based on consensus several governments that do not 
favor a legal framework due to the reasons mentioned above, could vote against its 
implementation. Above all, it is also doubtful if countries put laws into actions as 
present examples of non-compliance to international treaties show. An epitome is 
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, a document established by the 
United Nations in order to ban the execution of the death penalty which was for 
instance not ratified by the United States355.  
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Of course the implementation of an international regulation committee would induce 
costs that should not be underestimated in this discussion. In order to be able to 
monitor hundreds of PMCs and its operational standards on a constant basis a large 
number of highly qualified employees is required. As private companies in this 
branch operate on the whole globe and not only in town-offices, but on the fields of 
war an enormous outlay can be expected to control their activities. Inspectors would 
be needed at numerous scenes of conflicts and in various countries – not only in the 
committee’s headquarters. The question is who will finance the expenses. PMCs 
would not pay by any means as most of them are not in favor of regulation. So why 
should they pay for something they do not want and of which they are convinced to 
be harmful to their business? Governments would not be eager to sponsor either as 
they would have to pay more for services then as they do now. However if they 
finance it, this could be very beneficial for them as they could rely on their clients’ 
proper and legal standards.  
 
Summing up, only the international community, for instance the United Nations, 
could be financially liable for arising costs. As peace-keeping missions could be 
performed cheaper using private contractors the U.N. should invest in order to save 
funds in future times. In this case it must be mentioned that governments would 
indirectly sponsor the committee as most of them are members of the United 
Nations and thereby have to render dues to the international community.  
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8 Advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing 
8.1 Advantages 
 
Most advantages of outsourcing have already been mentioned in the chapter four, 
yet are summarized in the following: 
The past outsourcing success within the U.S. Army shows that focusing on core 
competencies and shuffling of non-core tasks results in cost savings and several 
other advantages. Besides the financial edge, acquiring private experience also puts 
the U.S. Army into the situation of using state-of-the-art equipment, it would not be 
able to produce, maintain or handle itself due to a lack of technologies and money. 
The private sector is able to develop highly sophisticated defense systems as it has 
the financial resources and experience in the high-tech branch. The non-existence 
of pompous administrative machinery facilitates private institutions to be very 
flexible, to adopt new technologies and to react on fast changing requirements in the 
defense realm. Furthermore, private suppliers are mostly facing harsh competition 
and therefore they are forced to perform cost saving and efficiently which again 
results in decent prices for the U.S. Army. Being released from non-core 
competencies the Army can use freed resources for tasks they are experts in: to 
care for the nation’s security and to combat in the case of war.  
 
8.2 Disadvantages 
 
Though it is proved and meanwhile common business knowledge that outsourcing is 
likely to have numerous positive effects, a lot of criticism by outsourcing opponents 
came up since the beginning of the new millennium. Understandably, U.S. Army 
employees fear that they could lose their jobs if even more parts of the army get 
outsourced. Federal employee unions condemn U.S. Army outsourcing initiatives 
and vow to lobby members of Congress to stop it. “Rather than save money, this 
Army privatization scheme is all about moving money — to politically well-connected 
contractors356” says Bobby Harnage, president of the American Federation of 
Government Employees and alludes to the interweaving between Cheney’s political 
and private business’ careers. As already mentioned in this paper the Vice President 
and other U.S. government policy-makers came under fire due to rumors of making 
contracts without a fair competition: 
 
In the early 1990s, KBR, one of the biggest PMCs, was the company that was 
awarded the job to study and then implement privatization of routine army functions 
under Dick Cheney, then secretary of defense. When Cheney quit his job at the 
Pentagon, he landed the job as chief executive of KBR, having the knowledge of 
what it takes to get awarded a contract by the U.S. Government. In 2000, Cheney 
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again changed the sides, when he was elected vice-president. Since then KBR has 
received several big contracts from the U.S. Army. Critics charge that this is a 
classic example of the “revolving door between government and big business357“. 
Bill Hartung, senior research fellow at the World Policy Institute in New York, says: 
"Cheney gives new meaning to the term revolving door. If he does not get elected 
president next, I have no doubt he will return to Halliburton when he leaves the 
White House358." Finally, Harvey Wasserman says the Kellogg, Brown & Root 
contracts are a scandal:  "The Bush-Cheney team have turned the United States 
into a family business. That's why we haven't seen Cheney -- he's cutting deals with 
his old buddies who gave him a multi-million dollar golden handshake359."  
 
Besides the problem of unfair competition of outsourcing contracts political 
representatives are also concerned about the possible downsizing of jobs in the 
U.S. Army that outsourcing might cause. The following letter from Paul E. Kanjorski, 
member of the congress, to Thomas White, Secretary of the Army, highlights the 
general concern about job cuts when federal institutions get subject of outsourcing 
projects: 
   
 
Dear Secretary White:       October 9th, 2002 
 
    It has come to my attention that the Department of the Army recently 
launched … a new initiative aimed at increasing outsourcing and privatization 
efforts. As you begin to implement this plan, I write to inform you of the important, 
efficient, and competent work performed by the men and women who work at the 
Tobyhanna Army Depot and to express my serious reservations about pursuing this 
initiative at this time. 
… 
     Because of the previous outstanding performance by Tobyhanna’s 
employees and the job opportunities provided by the facility, I have serious concerns 
about the Department of the Army’s efforts to expand its outsourcing and 
privatization efforts. As we continue to experience economic uncertainty, fight the 
war on terrorism, and pursue potential military action against Iraq, we must ensure 
that nothing disrupts the effectiveness of our Armed Forces.  
… 
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  Moreover, I have strong reservations about whether privatization is the most 
appropriate long-term strategy for such an important mission as efficiently providing 
vital goods and services and proficiently maintaining and repairing equipment for our 
Armed Forces. 
… 
I additionally request respectfully that the Department of the Army act with 
extreme caution in undertaking these privatization plans during this time of 
uncertainty. Moreover, I also request that you keep me informed of the status of the 
Department of the Army’s privatization plans, particularly as they relate to the 
Tobyhanna Army Depot.  
Sincerely, 
Paul E. Kanjorski, Member of Congress360
 
 
 
A third problem represents the complexity of legal status of PMCs’ employees as 
already discussed in chapter seven. The relevance of this topic can be found in the 
current situation of the war in Iraq. Recent TV reports showing U.S. troops torturing 
Iraqi prisoners resulted in shocked viewers on the whole globe. Investigations found 
that not all perpetrators were actually members of the U.S. Army and not all wore 
uniforms. Therefore Peter Singer of the Brookings Institute questions if functions 
such as interrogating the prisoners should have been outsourced without due 
consideration and debate361.  
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II PPPs – the German way of profiting from the private 
sector 
 
1 PPPs - managing public tasks at low budget times 
 
The shifting of public tasks to private suppliers in armed forces is not a phenomenon 
only occurring within the U.S. Army but recently also arising in European countries.  
The major difference in the participation of the commercial sector between the 
United States and most European nations is found in the way how the private sector 
is used. While in America outsourcing, hereby referring to contracting out entire 
services, production of goods or warfare missions to private contractors that are fully 
owned by private investors and not by the U.S. Army, is mainly used, in Europe 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP), which are more detailed described in the 
following, are a common tool.  
 
 
The rationale of the usage of PPPs within the German Army resembles the reasons 
for PPPs’ rise in federal and communal projects as well as the grounds for the use 
of PMCs within the U.S. Army. Although fields of application sometimes substantially 
vary, e.g. from public housing to combat support, the cost factor, expected 
improvements in the efficiency and a decline in personnel due to budget 
curtailments remain the main drivers for public cooperation with the private sector. 
Taking the Maastricht criteria, which are obligatory budget and leverage guidelines 
for all European Union member states, into consideration it is evident that every new 
investment of a nation constitutes a burden for the attainment of these duties. 
Therefore budget- and liquidity bottlenecks cause a situation in which utmost 
important investments, such as infrastructure, logistics or security projects are likely 
not to be made. As a consequence alternative ways of financing have to be taken 
into consideration and can be found using PPP.  
 
Besides mastering a troubled financial situation also optimization and improvements 
in efficiency attach importance to public activities. Examples drawn from public 
building projects evince that approximately 20% of planned costs can be saved due 
to more efficient and improved planning and performance by using PPPs. 
Furthermore the European Union’s policy of liberalization and privatization put the 
provision of federal tasks, e.g. waste disposal, public transport and electricity supply, 
into competition with the private sector.  
 
However, there are also reasons that pander the use of PPPs compared to other 
methods of private accomplishment of public tasks. In a conventional situation of 
shifting tasks to private institutions many public employees lose their jobs as their 
functions are not needed any more. Using a PPP has the advantage that private 
companies take over those employees and give them the opportunity to work in their 
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accustomed field of environment and area of knowledge and experience362. Yet not 
only the personnel but also the PPP profits from the subsequent use of employees 
as they bring along pre-existing and specialized know-how which is of course also 
needed in the new established cooperation. Therefore a win-win-win situation is 
created; the third winner being represented by the general public’s gain of safety. 
Furthermore a trend towards decentralized procurement of resources and positive 
experiences from foreign PPPs led to exaltation in the willingness of launching 
PPPs363. Concerning the German Army, where renewal, substitution and 
modernization of army equipment still have to take place in order to guarantee 
security for citizens, PPPs have proved to be very effective and cost saving. 
 
In order to facilitate the commence of PPPs the German Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Building and Housing established the so called PPP Task Force. This 
group’s activities include project support, fundamental and coordination work, public 
relations and knowledge transfer. PPP projects within the German Army will also 
represent pilot projects of the PPP Task Force that already installed their own 
working group for defense infractructure planning whose duty is to determine 
possible fields for PPPs. According to the task force particularly new ways of 
procurement of equipment seem to be very suitable for public private cooperation364. 
 
Besides the PPP Task Force there exist several other institutions that work within 
the realm of development, consulting and future aspects of PPPs. The European 
Association for Defence Public Private Partnership – EPPP is a lobby with the aim of 
encouraging and optimizing cooperation between the public and the private sector 
and advancing research and science within this field365.  A second interest group is 
the Bundesverband Public Private Partnership, whose goals are listed in the 
following: 
 
• Organization and discussion of PPPs’ development at national and 
international level 
• Analysis of PPPs’ potentials for Germany 
• Evaluation of international experiences 
• Recommendations and encouragement of PPPs in potential areas 
• Know-how transfer366 
 
The following paragraphs cover special aspects of PPPs in the German Army. Once 
again it should be noted that whenever the term PPP is used it refers to PPP in a 
narrower sense.  
                                                
362 BW Fuhrparkservice (2005), http://www.bwfuhrpark.de 
363 Comp. Prozessleitfaden Public Private Partnership (2003), p.24ff. 
364 Comp. BMWA (2003), p.10 
365 Comp. EPPP (2004), http://www.eppp.org 
366 Comp. BPPP (2005), http://www.bppp.de 
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2 G.E.B.B. 
 
In its endeavor to accelerate and facilitate the development of PPP within the field of 
defense, an agency responsible for innovation, investment and economy of the 
German Army, fully owned by the German Ministry of Defense, namely G.E.B.B., 
was intended in the 1999 basic agreement between the Defense Ministry and the 
private sector, and finally established in 2000. This agency, which is established as a 
private limited company, is able to provide additional resources for investments for 
the German Army as it is mobilizes private capital as well as it significantly reduces 
operating costs and capital employed367. Its main tasks are to advise the Ministry on 
efficiency in procurement and operation and to develop concepts of reorganization of 
the service structure. Taken all that tasks into consideration it is apparent that 
G.E.B.B. relieves the troops of several non-core tasks and brings the advantage that 
it can refocus on its core-competencies368.  
 
Another major function of G.E.B.B. is found in its status as a holding company for 
PPPs. The following figure illustrates its stakes in PPPs: 
 
 
 
Figure 16: G.E.B.B.-Holding and its stakes in PPPs369
 
The graph above displays the agency’s stake in three PPPs, namely the BW 
Fuhrpark Service, the LH Bekleidungsgesellschaft and the IT-Company of the 
Bundeswehr. Furthermore the private sector’s participation in respective PPPs is 
                                                
367 Comp. G.E.B.B. (2005), http://www.gebb.de 
368 Comp. G.E.B.B. (2004), http://www.gebb.de and Wieland (2003), p.2 
369 G.E.B.B. (2005), http://www.gebb.de 
 100
shown and illustrates the composition of owners of a public-private partnership. The 
two companies mentioned first were found in 2000 and are the premier successful 
conversions of public provision to PPP responsibility. The LH Bundeswehr 
Bekleidungsgesellschaft, a company set up and owned by the German Ministry of 
Defense and a private consortium, is responsible for the procurement of personal 
apparel and equipment of the German Army whereas the BW Fuhrpark Service is a 
PPP that is in charge of the civil vehicle fleet management. Nevertheless, there are 
many more areas within the realm of the German Army that are subject to PPP. As 
the following figure shows the two already found public-private partnerships only 
account to 10% of the possible non-core service tasks: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Listing of service-non-core tasks suitable for PPPs370
 
 
Having 90% of those functions, which amount for €9,45 billion or comparatively 
almost 3% of the Austrian GDP,  still performed by the Ministry of Defense itself it is 
very obvious that there exists large potential for the establishment of further PPPs in 
the future. Particularly facility management, which causes almost 15% of the German 
Army’s total costs, is one of the items that the agency will transform into public-
private partnerships. As a consequence unutilized soil and facilities could be sold or 
profitably exploited.  
 
The advantages of commercial solutions compared to federal provision are manifold.  
 
First, jobs are not killed off, as staff that is not needed by the German Army anymore 
is used by third-party providers which also introduce the staff to work procedures of 
                                                
370 G.E.B.B. (2005), http://www.gebb.de 
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the private sector. Secondly, state-of-the-art know-how and financial resources from 
the commercial sector are connected with military expertise and therefore these two 
sources facilitate great effects of synergy. Thirdly, procurement processes are 
simplified and de-bureaucratized and thereby they help to save costs.  
Finally concentration on core-competencies can be reached as soldiers are able to 
refocus on military tasks and the private sector renders civil services371. 
 
The success of the G.E.B.B. holding specified below shows that PPP is not merely a 
theoretical concept but a solution for the future of the German Army and thereby it 
sets an example for many other countries aiming to modernization in their armies 
though facing financial bottlenecks. 
 
Already in 2003, only two years after its foundation, G.E.B.B. broke even and was 
able to save costs at the amount of € 290 million. This prosperity was reached with 
the help of external consultants, such as Roland Berger Strategy Consultants or 
Ernst & Young Consultants, which got contracted by the agency. According to 
G.E.B.B., expenditures for consultancy will shrink in future as the agency has 
already been able to adopt the necessary know-how itself. Nevertheless also 
independent certified accountants and controllers attested proper business 
procedures and confirmed G.E.B.B.’s success372.  
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Table 6: Savings achieved through the use of PPPs373
 
                                                
371 Comp. G.E.B.B. (2005), http://www.gebb.de 
372 Comp. G.E.B.B. (2004), http://www.gebb.de 
373 modelled after G.E.B.B. (2005), http://www.gebb.de 
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This table shows that the initial costs in 2000 and 2001, which were mainly the result 
of establishment expenditures and external consultancy, are comparatively low in 
relation to the savings which were accomplished in 2002 and 2003. 
 
 103
3 HIL 
 
It is important to mention that G.E.B.B. is not the only result of the Defense 
Ministry’s attempts to attain greater success through the use of the commercial 
sector. In early 2005 the appropriations committee of the German Bundestag 
decided to found the HIL (Heeresinstandsetzungslogistik) GmbH, an agency owned 
by the German Bund and a consortium of three private contractors, namely Krauss-
Maffei Wegmann, Rheinmetall Landsysteme and Industriewerke Saar. Its core tasks 
include the maintenance and reparation of selected military equipment. According to 
the German Army, HIL will be able to increase the availability of weapon systems 
determined in the contract to 70%. Furthermore several other advantages are 
expected and listed above: 
 
 
• Relief of non-core tasks 
• Usage of freed capacities for preparation and accomplishment of 
military operations 
• Linkage between know-how and key-competencies of the three 
commercial partners and experience of the German Army 
• Inclusion of small and medium sized enterprises 
• Preservation of military-technical acknowledgement and 
development of this branch 
 
In order to be able to prove the progress and success of HIL the Defense Ministry is 
obliged to report to the appropriations committee on a yearly basis374.  
 
 
                                                
374 Comp. Bundeswehr (2005), http://www.bundeswehr.de & Schweizer Soldat 
(2005), http://www.schweizer-soldat.ch 
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4 Selected legal aspects of PPPs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
According to the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour the 
development of PPP in Germany is hampered by the fact that there do not exist any 
universally valid laws, neither in German nor in European statues, concerning 
guidelines, commandments or prohibition of PPP. The reason for this lack is founded 
in a missing harmonization of the various concepts of PPP. The German government 
merely recommended acting economically in order to improve the economic 
situation375. Concerning PPP within the field of the German Army, another legal 
difficulty occurs. Federal basic law implies that there exists federal proviso for certain 
functions, such as security, the provisions of public transport or electricity376. 
However, some of these laws were modified in order to allow private suppliers to 
support or even replace public providers due to already mentioned reasons of less 
costs and greater efficiency377. 
 
An example represents Art. 87e, the 1993 revised version, of the German Basic law 
which states that national railways, having been a monopoly business for decades, 
might have to be established as private-law companies and that the federal 
government guarantees to take public welfare into account. Latest statement implies 
that, although it is not clearly stated, private supply of public functions should be 
supported as it is more economical and cost saving. Nevertheless, this ruling does 
not state that the government should withdraw from activities but establish 
framework directives for commercial procurement and keep oversight378. 
The example of national railways shows that services, rendered by the public sector 
and inherently connected with merely federal provision for decades, are getting 
subject to PPP. Therefore and also as a consequence of international success in 
similar projects, also the defense area represents a domain which could to some 
extent profit from private performance379.  
 
 
4.2 Subset cases of PPPs 
 
Within the realm of PPPs there are plenty of topics that could and should be 
extensively discussed. As dealing with all of them would go beyond the scope of this 
paper merely some, but very instructional aspects of the large field of the tendering 
process are chosen to be illustrated in the following: 
                                                
375 Comp. BMWA (2003), p.11 
376 Comp. GG, Art.87 
377 Comp. Juristische Fakultät, Humboldt Universität Berlin (2001), 
http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de 
378 Comp. Wieland (2003), p.1 
379 Comp. Drömann (2001), p.24 
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The procedure for awarding public contract concerning PPPs has become a major 
issue for lawmakers within European countries and the European Union. As a basic 
principle national public contract placing authorities, such as local communities or 
the Ministry of Defense are beholden to apply public tender procedures, being 
guidelines determined by the European Court of Justice, when goods or services 
are subject for procurement. This ruling aims to the opening of domestic public 
procurement markets in order to attain the European Single Market also in the field 
of public tendering. Nevertheless, the implementation and appliance of these laws 
led to several difficulties and discrepancy as the following cases show:  
 
 
4.2.1 The case of TECKAL (1999) 
Nevertheless, there is an exceptional case, namely the in-house deal, in which the 
public agency is not always obliged to start an invitation to tender. This deal 
describes a situation in which the public agency does not buy needed supplies from 
the commercial market but provides them with its own personnel and resources 
itself.  
These in-house deals gain importance when public contracts are awarded to PPPs 
as questions of ownership and its effects on tendering procedures arise. Due to the 
fact that conditions for in-house deals are not settled in European tendering 
guidelines, it is unclear and very controversial if contracts awarded to PPPs also 
constitute in-house deals as private parties are stakeholders and not only the public 
but also their personnel and resources are used380. Therefore, the question whether 
the awarding of contracts to PPPs without tendering is allowed or not is very 
significant381. Concerning this complex issue the European Court of Justice has 
rendered a statement of policy in its TECKAL-ruling. Latter defines the conditions 
under which a tendering of public procurement does not have to be carried out: 
The two strings attached are: 
 
• the awarding agency has to have the same governance 
of the PPP as it has over itself 
• the activities determined in the contract have to be 
performed for the beneficial use of the public agency382 
 
 
However, the European Court of Justice mistook to clearly define details on the two 
attributes stated above and as a result further complex legal discrepancies 
occurred383. Three examples of those issued are described in the following: 
                                                
380 Comp. Bergmann (2005) 
381 Comp. Zeiss (2005), http://www.juratus.com 
382 Comp. Zeiss (2005), http://www.juratus.com and DSTGB-VIS (2005), 
http://www.dstgb-vis.de 
383 Comp. VKU (2005a), http://www.vku.de 
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4.2.2 The case of LHBW (2003) 
 
Nevertheless, the following case of the already mentioned LH Bundeswehr 
Bekleidungsgesellschaft (LHBW) shows that PPPs still have to face legal 
uncertainties. When this private-law company was entering negotiations with 
producers about the supply of more than 80.000 combat boots needed by the 
German Army, the OLG Düsseldorf, a higher appeal court, passed sentence that 
LHBW was obliged to start a public tendering due to the fact that the company, 
though only being controlled for 25,1% by the Ministry of Defense, appears like a 
public contract placing authority384. This decision was substantiated by the court’s 
view that the procurement of equipment for the German Army constitutes a task with 
common public interest as well as LHBW would still be under the aegis of the 
Ministry despite only having a minority stake in the PPP. Furthermore the court 
argues that a public tender cannot be simply bypassed by using several 
intermediate tendering institutions, such as the LHBW385.  
 
 
4.2.3 The case of Lüdinghausen and Olfen (2004) 
 
In the case of several German communities, Lüdinghausen, Olfen and others, which 
awarded contracts for waste disposal, the European Court of Justice ruled that 
service contracts between public agencies and semi-public institutions, that have 
been signed on the assumption of an in-house situation and thereby have not 
applied public tendering procedures in the past, still represent unlawful proceeding 
until they are discontinued386. Although the court previously informed German 
officials that those contracts ought to be terminated they neglected to act in that way 
and therefore they European Community started that case387. This ruling might imply 
that contracts awarded illegally due to non-compliance with European tendering 
guidelines have to be cancelled, reversed and put for public tendering process.  
 
 
4.2.4 The case of  RPL Lochau (2005) 
 
In 2005, the European Court of Justice had to judge in the lawsuit between the 
German city of Halle, together with the PPP RPL Lochau, and a private consortium, 
namely TREA Leuna. As the city awarded a contract for waste disposal to the PPP, 
which was earlier established and controlled by a 100% subsidiary of the community 
for 75,9%, and by the private sector for 24,9%, without applying public tendering 
procedures TREA Leuna, a competing enterprise, that was also interested in the 
contract, appealed to the regional tender commission for a procedure on review of 
                                                
384 Comp. OLG Düsseldorf, Verg 67/02 (2003) 
385 Comp. Wagner, O. & Wiegand, F. (2003) and Leinemann & Partner (2005), 
http://www.leinemann-partner.com 
386 Comp. BKA (2005), p.3 
387 Comp. ECJ C-125/03 (2004): 
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the contract388. In its response the city argued that the contract represented an in-
house deal that would not have needed a public tendering as the control of the PPP 
would be attributed to the community. Nevertheless, the commission ruled in favor 
of TREA Leuna and consequently the city filed an appeal against the judgment at 
the regional appeal court which relayed the case to the European Court of Justice. 
The latter passed sentence that contract awarding to an enterprise with a partial 
private stake, such as a PPP or any other semi-private institution, does not 
represent an in-house deal in terms of the TECKAL-jurisdiction and therefore public 
tendering has to be performed389. Additionally, it argued that the extent of private 
participation does not affect the case in no respect390. 
 
 
4.2.5 Exceptions as mentioned in the EU-Treaty 
 
The just shown cases have all in common that they deal with the procurement of 
products and services being important for armies yet not definitely security sensitive. 
Latest functions, such as the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material, which are connected with a European Union Member State’s essential 
interests of security, constitute an exception concerning tendering guidelines. Article 
296 of the European Union’s Amsterdam treaty states the following: 
 
“The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application 
of the following rules: 
(a) … 
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers 
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its 
security which are connected with the production of or trade in 
arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not 
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common 
market regarding products which are not intended for specifically 
military purposes391.” 
 
This article is utmost important as the exception from actual European tendering 
guidelines might result in restricted competition within the realm of the European 
Union.  
                                                
388 Comp. VKU (2005b), http://www.vku.de 
389 Comp. ECJ C-26/03 (2005) 
390 Comp. Zeiss (2005) and BKA (2005), p.3 
391 European Union (1997), Art. 296 
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5 Conclusion 
 
5.1 Is PPP a worthwhile method? 
 
In respect of the successful examples of public-private-partnerships within the field 
of the German Army, as illustrated in the second part of this paper, it can be 
assumed that this new kind of cooperation constitutes a desirable future for the 
defense realm in general. Not only PPPs offer the possibility to provide state-of-the-
art equipment and highly skilled personnel that could not be anymore afforded by 
armies themselves due to financial bottlenecks for military tasks but also they 
release armies from non-core tasks and thereby make it possible for them to focus 
on core-tasks. PPPs represent a solution for the modern army’s procurement and 
provision of service tasks. Although there are many more reasons for this behavior 
the most important are displayed in the following:   
 
 
 
Key drivers 
 
• Financial need (budget deficit) 
• Ageing or poor infrastructure 
• Growing demands or expectations on public sector services 
• Desire to introduce competition 
• Shortage of domestic experience and skills 
• Desire to educate national contractors and remain competitive 
• Bandwagon effect 
 
 
Table 7: Key drivers for the establishment of PPPs392
 
 
Nevertheless PPPs may only lead to success if certain reasonable terms and 
conditions are redeemed. First, it is utmost important to clarify which areas of 
responsibility bring along the potential for a conversion into a PPP. Due to legal 
restrictions not every task can be performed by any supplier but should and 
hopefully will remain a state activity. Latter are very narrowly defined as 
governments came to the conclusion that the private sector is the better 
entrepreneur and therefore by privatizing tasks or having state tasks performed by 
PPPs costs can be saved and exceeding budget appropriations avoided. 
Exemplarily former monopolistic administered state businesses, such as railways, 
postal services and electricity provision were privatized, at least major parts of it, 
and this trend did not spare to various armies. Also, within the field of defense some 
functions will continue to be provided by the state itself, such as combat or other 
core-competencies, whereas others will be performed by semi-public, namely PPPs, 
or commercial enterprises. The establishment of a PPP being in charge of the 
                                                
392 Modelled after Grimsey and Lewis (2004), p.234 
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army’s motor pool and another responsible for the equipping soldiers with proper 
apparel are epitomes of successful private execution of former army and therewith 
also state activities. However, there are many more than only these two fields where 
PPPs can be introduced: facility management or catering are only two further of 
several tasks that could be subjects for PPPs in future. Anyhow, without certain 
framework conditions, the establishment of public-private-partnerships will be 
severely hampered. These most important terms are listed in the following: 
 
 
 
 
Conditions for PPPs’ establishment 
 
• Political framework: stability, explicit political will or commitment … 
• Desire for lean management 
• Legal framework: no hindrances and complex jurisdiction 
• Public acceptance: acceptance of private sector involvement  
• Quality practitioners: good quality, experienced project sponsors and lenders 
• Readily available finance: including EU and EIB funding in some cases; 
mature or sophisticated banking sector and capital markets culture 
 
 
 
Table 8: Key conditions for the establishment of PPPs393
 
 
The political willingness of using PPPs is very evident as the boom of privatizations 
and the use of private suppliers for public tasks in recent decades have shown. In 
most cases nothing else remains to be done than cooperating with the obviously 
more efficient commercial sector as nation’s budgets drastically require savings 
policy in order to fulfill international guidelines, such as the Maastricht-criteria. In this 
context the catchword public lean management also underlines governmental 
policies of performing state activities in a more consumer-orientated way. Similar to 
the private sector where the customer’s view is most important for the production of 
goods and provision of services also public institutions try to react on the citizen’s 
demand and wishes. In order to reach this goal establishing PPPs is a perfect 
method. Besides the political framework also the legal framework represents a 
relevant issue when it comes to public-private partnerships. As the cases of the 
German waste disposal contracts for PPPs presented in this paper show a clear and 
national, or even better a European Union wide, valid legal framework dealing with 
PPPs in all of its stages, from issues concerning the legal form of cooperation to the 
establishment of tendering guidelines, has to be set up in order to iron out any 
hindrances for PPPs foundations. Furthermore, without people’s consent, politicians 
will not likely be able to push PPPs as they also have to bear in mind that 
unsatisfied electors will not vote in favor of them. Therefore, political parties have to 
develop strategies that convince the public of the advantages of such co-operations 
                                                
393 Modelled after Grimsey and Lewis (2004), p.234  
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and additionally provide plausible reasons that take away many people’s fear of 
redundancy when jobs are displaced from the state to PPPs. Once PPPs are 
established, control procedures have to be implemented and permanently further 
developed in order to ensure ongoing efficiency by the contracted PPPs.  
 
Finally, it has to be said that PPPs do not merely represent a mean of procurement 
and provision but also act as an instrument of financing and investment. Exemplarily 
it can be assumed that without the establishment of the BW Fuhrpark the German 
Army now would not be in the position to have newest car makes at its disposal. The 
reason for that situation is that together with a private partner and its financial 
sources and possibilities it was possible to equip the forces with most up to date 
vehicles, an eventuality that could have never been realized with the German 
Army’s resources itself. Particularly concerning the various timeworn defense 
facilities and their costly maintenance and preservation the foundation of PPPs 
could bring remedy.  
 
Summing up, the instrument of PPPs, and the way they fulfill a government’s certain 
tasks by combining public and private experience, know-how and financial 
resources, represents a perfect solution for the performance of activities within the 
Defense realm if the conditions mentioned above are given. Once all hindrances 
and obstacles removed there is no bar to future success of public-private-
partnerships. 
 
  
5.2 PMC or PPP – What is the better method? 
 
Benchmarking defines the process of identifying the standards and best practices 
within one industry or branch. Results of such a comparison of market players are 
especially important for weaker companies or institutions in order to be able to 
improve performance394. Likening the different business policies and procedures is 
achieved by certain measurement techniques that determine the gaps being 
responsible for better or worse output. Concerning the topic of this paper it is not 
easy to set benchmarks as the backgrounds, frameworks and procedures of the two 
portrayed cases, outsourcing in the U.S. Army and PPPs in the German Army, 
widely differ. Nevertheless, in the following the advantages and disadvantages of 
the two mentioned cases are pointed out and commented on.  
 
Private Military Companies strongly discern from Public-Private-Partnerships, as on 
the one hand, they are fully owned by the private sector and do not have a public 
stake. On the other hand already the term PPP bespeaks a public share in such 
enterprises even if it is negligible small in some cases. The advantage of the latter’s 
policy is that public institutions always remain in control of the newly found company 
and its activities. This issue is very important when it comes to questionable 
assignments or contracts as the government is always in the position to exert 
                                                
394 Comp. Thommen (2004b), p.783 
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influence on the company’s decisions. Furthermore, the public sector is able to bias 
the aggregate economical development as it can foster small and medium sized 
firms. The drawback of the partial governmental control on PPPs coevally 
represents the advantage of PMCs, namely the freedom in the performance of their 
contracts. Neither do they have to obey public tendering guidelines nor are they 
constricted in their choice of subcontractors. However, less bureaucracy and control 
in the area of PMCs have the disadvantage that the contractors, namely defense 
authorities, lose insight into the outsourced operations and thereby often 
involuntarily admit to doubtful business policies.  
 
The best examples for such a situation represent the many PMCs that operate very 
close to scenes of war and sometimes even directly engage in fighting. As 
mentioned previously in this paper, the lack in monitoring of the activities of such 
companies already led to severe incidents, including murder and other serious 
criminal deeds. The occurrences at the ABU Ghraib prison in Iraq, where U.S. Army 
contractors were sued over allegations of abuse, represent only a small piece of this 
troubled issue395. Additionally a legal framework concerning fully privately owned 
military actors was never established and therefore it still is a complex issue to draw 
an exact line between the terms mercenary and PMC. On the contrast PPPs within 
the realm of the German Army mostly have a good reputation and if they are once 
criticized it involves economical issues but never any criminal offences.  
 
Concerning the different tendering methods it is important to mention that to all 
appearances, both in the United States where the A-76 program is the procedure for 
outsourcing as well as in Germany where public institutions are beholden to apply 
public European Union’s public tendering procedures, fair methods of contracting 
are used. Nevertheless the United States government had to take harsh criticism 
due to some irregularities in the tendering of their LOGCAP contracts as they were 
blamed for political and private interweaving.  
 
Summing up, financial bottlenecks, the desire to introduce competition and 
shortages of experience that inhibit armies to maintain or improve their 
infrastructure, logistics and after all their combat readiness and power led to private 
participation in the defense sector. Waiving if the instrument either is a PPP or PMC, 
it is utmost important that national governments and international institutions soon 
create the legal frameworks that are necessary for proper private stake in the 
sensitive area of security and defense. Furthermore, public institutions have to 
handle a twofold situation: on the one hand, they are forced to work more and more 
efficient and in a way in which expenditures can be cut, and on the other hand they 
still have to act for the citizens and in behalf of their welfare. As public goods, such 
as defense, is all but cheap, one should only think of the cost of maintaining an 
army, a conflict of interest might arise and therefore public policy-makers are asked 
to solve the problem of the various different stakeholders’ interests.  
 
                                                
395 Comp. Beaumont (2005) 
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Nevertheless, this development is not a passing phase but represents the future of 
provision, procurement and financing of armies’ activities and will not be stemmed in 
any case.  
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Abstract 
 
Private military companies are not a transient phenomenon, but probably they 
present the future providers of military activities. Although security and defense have 
always been tasks that were exclusively performed by government institutions, the 
state monopoly on the instruments of force was weakened in the last decades as a 
result of the privatization trend. 
 
 
This change in the supplier of public services was triggered by worldwide occurring 
austerity measures which had a severe impact on defense budgets that were 
already heavily charged with enormous costs for more and more important logistic 
functions and the development of high-tech weapon systems within most armies. 
This gap of lacking financial resources and the coeval need in state-of-the-art 
equipment and service was soon filled by private providers, namely PMCs, being 
able to work more efficient as public institutions yet still cost-effective. Nevertheless, 
the defense array cannot be treated like any other industry that is privatized as 
whenever the exercise of force and weapons is concerned outmost precaution has 
to exhibit.  
 
Bearing in mind recent problems of irregularities at defense contracts tendering 
procedures and criminal convictions of private military company’s employees in the 
Iraq War it is indispensable to keep a tab on and possibly restrain the suppliers of 
privatized defense tasks. The options for inclusion of private companies for defense 
functions are manifold and show many peculiarities. As the United States have 
commonly taken a stake in international armed conflicts for decades and also have 
made full use of PMCs, this paper focuses on several aspects of outsourcing within 
the area of the U.S. Army. 
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Appendix 
 
LOGCAP 1 activities performed by BRS: 
 
Year Location/Operation Contractor 
1992-
1993 
Somalia - Operation Restore Hope U.S. Army 
 
 
• Support for 18.400 U.S. troops 
• Training of 2.500 Somalian workers 
• Operation and Maintenance of 9 base camps 
• Restoration of power and water supply to the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu 
and Mogadishu Airport 
 
Year Location/Operation Contractor 
1994 Rwanda - Operation Support Hope U.S. Army 
 
 
• Support for 2.500 soldiers in the region 
• Provision and Operation of water filtration plants 
• Procurement of water trucks in Europe and transportation to Rwanda 
 
Year Location/Operation Contractor 
1994 Rwanda - Operation Support Hope U.S. Army 
 
 
• Support for 18.000 U.S. and U.N. troops 
• Building and Maintenance of U.S. facilities 
• Processing of 27 ships and 45.000 passengers 
 
 
Year Location/Operation Contractor 
1995-
1996 
Bosnia, Hungary & Croatia - Operation Joint 
Endeavour 
NATO 
 
 
• Building of 19 base camps, operation of 32 base camps 
• 24-hr maintenance for 2,495 tents and 167 facilities 
• operation of 26 dining facilities and 5 laundry facilities 
 
Data from The Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF), in: 
http://www.iblf.org/csr/csrwebassist.nsf/content/a1a2i3b4.html#brown (18.3.2004) 
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